From Saviour-Seeking to National Renaissance

Political maturity, constitutional leadership and a shared foundation of rights

Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, MD, PhD, MBA

Analytical opinion essay. Publication revision: 13 October 2026. The argument is normative, not a survey of public opinion or a prediction of imminent regime change.

Executive Summary

This essay reformulates a political and moral concern: the widening gap between the struggle of Iranians inside Iran and the conduct of parts of the Iranian opposition abroad. Its central argument is that people inside Iran encounter politics through survival, dignity and freedom, because they bear the immediate cost of repression, imprisonment, poverty, execution, shootings and security pressure. By contrast, some elements of the diaspora opposition have at times approached politics through proximity to future power, control of platforms, symbolic status and even a premature imagination of dividing offices after the fall of the Islamic Republic.

I defend constitutional monarchy as a serious option for a modern and conciliatory transition to secular democracy. That preference does not establish a popular mandate, and it cannot displace the electorate’s choice. My criticism concerns leader-worship, political flattery, expectation of a saviour and competition for future privileges: behaviours that can weaken the very constitutional alternative their advocates claim to support.

The proposed solution is a return to a movement that rejects repression and defends common rights: no to the Islamic Republic, no to executions, no to torture, no to political imprisonment, no to the humiliation of prisoners and no to political Islam; and, positively, the defence of the right to life, release of political prisoners, independent truth-finding, individual accountability through independent investigation and fair trials, secular democracy, national renaissance and the right of the Iranian people to determine their future.

1. Two Different Arenas of Struggle: Inside Iran and Abroad

Political struggle inside and outside Iran is not of the same nature. Inside the country, politics is not an abstract, theatrical or identity-based matter. It is tied to everyday life, family security, employment, dress, speech, imprisonment, torture, execution and death. Every political call may expose people inside Iran to arrest, dismissal, shooting, internet shutdowns, denial of medical care or the destruction of their personal and family future.

Outside Iran, the costs are different. Distance from routine policing and detention may create more room for organising, but diaspora activists can still face transnational threats, pressure on relatives, discrimination and serious personal costs. These differences should not become a moral hierarchy between all people inside and outside Iran. The practical issue is whether those making public calls understand the risks borne by the people expected to act on them. Symbols and access to leaders become harmful when they displace attention to safety, feasibility and the consequences of political decisions.

This gap becomes dangerous when the diaspora behaves as if it owns the revolution while those inside Iran pay the real price. No liberation movement can achieve durable victory without an ethical and strategic bond between inside and outside. The diaspora must be the voice of those inside Iran, not their political master; it must create international pressure, not a marketplace for future power.

2. The Crown Prince as a Symbol of Unity, Not an Instrument for Capturing Power

For many of his supporters, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has functioned during moments of crisis as a psychological and symbolic focus of unity: a figure around whom dispersed groups may gather through a name, a flag, a historical memory and a shared hope. This function should not be underestimated. A society exhausted by decades of ideology, repression, migration, mistrust and social fragmentation needs a national adhesive that can connect past, present and future.

Yet this symbolic function must not be confused with the premature determination of the future form of government or the confiscation of the people’s sovereign will. The Crown Prince can serve as a leader of transition, an international voice, a symbol of unity and a focal point against the Islamic Republic. But the final form of government must be determined through a free, legal, democratic process based on the vote of the people.

Constitutional monarchy is valuable only when it is genuinely constitutional: when it means a constitution, parliament, elections, parties, secularism, media freedom, limitation of power and political competition. If monarchism degenerates into cult-like behaviour, sanctification, exclusion of critics, closed circles and demands for privilege, it contradicts the very spirit of constitutionalism.

3. Seeking Spoils before Victory: A Risk within the Diaspora Opposition

One of the most destructive phenomena in parts of the diaspora opposition is the mentality of seeking spoils before victory. Some have behaved as if the fall of the Islamic Republic were already guaranteed and imminent, and as if the main task were no longer organising people, defending prisoners or building human-rights pressure, but positioning themselves close to future centres of power and securing their share of posts and influence.

A scramble for posts is ethically corrosive and strategically damaging when it displaces public service. If activists spend their energy attacking one another, circulating accusations without adequate evidence, monopolising platforms or competing for symbolic access, the result can be a loss of trust. This is a criticism of conduct, not an allegation that every diaspora organisation or supporter behaves in this way.

My reading of the 1979 revolution warns against an enduring danger: placing personal loyalty above competence, forming closed circles around leaders and neglecting institutions that restrain power. The historical comparison is a caution, not a claim that different movements or periods are identical. A new political vocabulary alone cannot prevent another cycle of authoritarianism; accountable institutions and the right to dissent are essential.

4. Against Messianic Politics: Freedom Is Not Delivered from Outside

One psychological crisis of a repressed society is excessive hope in an external saviour. This saviour may be imagined as a political leader, a foreign power, a war, sanctions or an international coalition. Such hope is understandable: an exhausted and oppressed society needs a point to which it can attach hope. But when this hope replaces the political responsibility of the people themselves, it becomes dangerous.

No foreign power, no symbolic leader and no diaspora opposition can liberate Iran by themselves. Freedom becomes durable only when people see themselves as the authors of change. The Crown Prince, media organisations, foreign governments and Iranians abroad can facilitate, support and exert pressure. But the main force of transition must arise from within Iranian society itself.

This is not to blame the people. Those inside Iran have paid the highest price, and after each wave of repression it is natural for them to experience doubt, exhaustion, questioning and reassessment. The question “what was achieved by all this cost?” is legitimate. It cannot be answered by slogans or contempt. It requires honesty, organisation, strategy and the reconstruction of trust.

5. Constitutional Monarchy versus Political Leader-Worship

Constitutional monarchy, if properly understood, can provide Iran with a modern, conciliatory and institution-building framework. It can connect Iran’s historical tradition with the needs of a modern state, the requirement for stability and the principle of popular sovereignty. In a country where parties, institutions, social trust and parliamentary traditions have been severely damaged, a national symbol above partisan competition may have a unifying function.

But this is true only if constitutional monarchy is clearly separated from leader-worship, sanctification and blind obedience. Constitutionalism means that no individual stands above the law. It means that the monarchy, if chosen, must be limited, symbolic, national and subordinate to a constitution. It means parties may compete, media may criticise and citizens may decide the country’s future.

Therefore, criticism of the behaviour of some monarchists is not criticism of constitutional monarchy itself. On the contrary, defending constitutional monarchy requires criticism of precisely those behaviours that make it resemble authoritarianism, sectarianism or a competition for spoils. Iran’s future will not be built by unquestioning flattery. It will be built by law, merit, institutions and political ethics.

6. The Need for Shared Rights and Clear Opposition to Repression

The coalition-building argument advanced here is that opposition to concrete abuses can provide a shared starting point before agreement on a final constitutional model. This is a strategic proposal, not a universal law: positive commitments to equal citizenship, independent courts and free elections are also indispensable. The aim is to combine a clear rejection of repression with a credible account of the rights everyone would enjoy.

The shared platform I propose includes an end to executions, torture, arbitrary political detention, the humiliation of prisoners and the repression of women; freedom of expression, belief and association; independent truth-finding; and fair, individual accountability. Opposition to political Islam means opposition to religious domination of the state, not hostility to Muslims or the exclusion of peaceful religious citizens. Secular democracy must protect believers and non-believers equally. These commitments are consistent with the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [1]

Such a movement is compatible with constitutional monarchy and with a democratic republic. Differences can be left to the ballot box and a constituent process. The precondition for all of them is the end of the Islamic Republic and the formation of a transition based on human rights, secularism and the rule of law.

7. From Short-Term Crisis to Long-Term Possibility

In the short term, honesty is essential: people’s situation may become worse after each cycle of protest and repression. The regime may become more dependent on security institutions, more violent and more restrictive. Economic pressure, social control, street patrols, arrests and fear can make everyday life harder. To ignore this reality is to disrespect the lived experience of people inside Iran.

Repression may expose a serious legitimacy crisis, but it does not by itself establish that the state is about to collapse. Coercive institutions can remain durable even when public trust is low. The September 2026 UN fact-finding presentation documents severe repression and the suffering of civilians; it does not validate any prediction of a swift political outcome. Democratic organisation therefore needs endurance, care for affected people and realistic assessment of resources and risks. [2]

The present crisis is therefore both danger and opportunity. The danger is that the opposition may be consumed by exhaustion, internal conflict, mistrust and strategic deviation. The opportunity is that Iranian society may reach a new political maturity: moving beyond saviour-seeking, beyond purely identity-based slogans and toward a national, civil, secular and rights-based movement.

8. Conclusion: A National Renaissance, Not a Marketplace for Power

Iran’s future requires a national renaissance: a renaissance beyond political Islam, beyond the culture of violence, beyond exclusion, and back toward the human being, dignity, law, modernity and Iranian nationhood. This renaissance cannot be built merely by the slogans of monarchy or republic. It requires political maturity, ethical struggle, organisation, transparency and acceptance of the people’s right to decide.

The diaspora opposition must redefine its role: not the owner of the revolution, but the servant of the national movement; not a claimant to future offices, but a builder of international pressure; not a producer of endless internal disputes, but an organiser of defence for prisoners, families of the killed, the wounded and victims of repression.

People inside Iran should retain authority over the political future for which they bear such heavy costs. No demand for greater public responsibility should be used to shame an exhausted or endangered population into further exposure. The task of leadership is to widen people’s capacity to choose and organise safely. Whether the eventual choice is constitutional monarchy or a democratic republic, durable legitimacy must come from free consent, equal rights and institutions that remain open to peaceful change.

Sources and Further Reading

1. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Articles 1–3, 10–11 and 18–21.
2. UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, statement to the Human Rights Council, 21 September 2026.