Secular Democracy, Political Association and Institutional Responsibility

Original manuscript: 29 September 2026; revised for publication on 13 October 2026. The analysis and recommendations express my views.

Executive summary

This paper examines a specific question: if Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is presented internationally as an advocate of a secular, democratic and parliamentary future for Iran, what are the implications when experts working within the Iran Prosperity Project (IPP) maintain visible cooperation with politicians from the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD)? The question should not be reduced to whether contact with SD is inherently “good” or “bad”. A democratic project is better assessed by the purpose, transparency, breadth and institutional consequences of political engagement.

Public evidence confirms that both Arvin and Ardavan Khoshnood are listed as advisers in the Iran Prosperity Project. IPP describes itself as a reconstruction blueprint linked to the fifth pillar of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s campaign strategy and states that its objective includes democratic governance, rule of law, institutional reconstruction, security, economic recovery, rights and welfare. This gives contributors a public-policy responsibility extending beyond ordinary private political expression.

Public records also establish repeated cooperation with SD politicians in Iran-related advocacy. Ardavan has briefed the Swedish Parliament at the invitation of SD MP Nima Gholam Ali Pour; both brothers co-authored a 2026 Svenska Dagbladet article with SD politicians Charlie Weimers and Nima Gholam Ali Pour; and Arvin records participation in a 3 June 2026 IPP seminar in Parliament organised by SD and the Christian Democrats. These facts establish cooperation. They do not, on the evidence reviewed here, establish that either brother is an SD member or that either endorses the whole SD platform.

The central institutional issue is role separation. If IPP is to function as a technocratic blueprint for a future democratic Iran rather than as an extension of a Swedish party network, its experts should be able to work with democratically elected actors across the political spectrum while making clear when they speak personally, when they speak as subject-matter experts, and when—if ever—they speak for IPP.

1. The analytical standard: secular democracy is a method as well as a destination

My recent work proposes a demanding standard. In “Pahlavi Plus”, the proposed synthesis combines state capacity and national development with secular democracy, equal citizenship, free party competition, judicial independence, free media, accountable technocracy and a final decision on the constitutional form of government by the people. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is envisaged as a possible focal point for transition, but not as the owner of the state or a substitute for popular sovereignty.

The companion essays sharpen the point: secular democracy is not only a description of the desired future regime; it is a political procedure that should already govern coalition-building. Liberals, social democrats, democratic conservatives, republicans, constitutional monarchists and religious citizens who accept equal rights and separation of religion and state can cooperate without surrendering their distinct identities. The boundary is conduct and commitment to democratic rules, not whether an actor is conventionally labelled left or right.

This framework is especially relevant here. If a movement claims pluralism abroad while practising ideological exclusion internally, it creates a credibility problem. Conversely, pluralism does not require political naivety: cooperation can be conditional, issue-specific, transparent and subject to scrutiny.

2. What is established about the Khoshnood brothers and IPP?

The official Iran Prosperity Project website lists both Ardavan Khoshnood and Arvin Khoshnood among the project’s advisers. The project describes a network of more than 70 Iranian experts and presents its work as a blueprint covering governance, rule of law and institutions, security, economic recovery, rights and welfare. Its “About” material links the project to the reconstruction pillar of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s five-pronged strategy and says the Emergency Phase is intended to reduce volatility through coordinated economic, legal and political reconstruction and to support democratic governance and a renewed social contract.

Ardavan’s public biography additionally describes him as an “Advisor — Iran Prosperity Project” from 2026 onward. Arvin’s public account records his participation in a June 2026 parliamentary IPP seminar. A May 2026 Svenska Dagbladet article by Ardavan, Arvin and IPP director Saeed Ghasseminejad was explicitly described as written by contributors from the Iran Prosperity Project.

3. Their documented political direction

3.1 Ardavan Khoshnood

The public record reviewed for this article indicates a political trajectory centred on Iranian constitutional monarchism, opposition to the Islamic Republic, security policy, support for Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and engagement with Swedish political institutions. Cooperation with a party on a particular policy question should not be treated as proof of formal affiliation.

More recent evidence shows sustained working relations with SD figures on Iran. In February 2026 Ardavan stated that he briefed Members of Parliament at the invitation of Nima Gholam Ali Pour (SD), discussed the Islamic Republic, IRGC activity, threats in Sweden and the role of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, and subsequently met Aron Emilsson, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Ardavan has also publicly praised Gholam Ali Pour’s parliamentary work on Iran. These are substantial political relationships in a defined policy field, but the available evidence still does not establish general party membership or wholesale endorsement of SD’s domestic programme.

3.2 Arvin Khoshnood

Arvin’s public profile is primarily that of a political scientist and Iran specialist. His website records expert contributions in Parliament, including a June 2026 seminar on “Iran and the Nordic Countries: From Security Challenges to Strategic Partnership” at an IPP event organised by the Sweden Democrats and Christian Democrats. Together with Ardavan, he has also co-authored public advocacy with SD representatives. This supports a description of issue-specific institutional cooperation, particularly on Iran, security and foreign policy. It does not by itself establish SD membership or complete ideological identification with the party.

4. Cooperation with SD: what can and cannot be inferred

5. Is association with SD compatible with a secular-democratic message?

Compatibility cannot be answered responsibly by party label alone. In the framework I propose, a democratic coalition is judged by whether participants accept equal citizenship, rule of law, free political competition, non-violence, minority rights and the right of citizens to replace those in power. I have argued that being left-wing, right-wing or religious is not by itself evidence of anti-democratic politics; programmes, conduct and acceptance of equal rights are the relevant tests.

Accordingly, dialogue or cooperation with SD politicians on Iran can be consistent with a secular-democratic project when it is issue-specific, transparent, non-exclusive and does not convert IPP into an instrument of a Swedish party. Elected politicians from different parties may have useful access, expertise, parliamentary mechanisms or policy convergence on Iranian state threats, protection of dissidents, sanctions, human rights and transition planning.

The potential tension arises at the level of public perception and institutional independence. A project that presents itself as a blueprint for equal citizenship in Iran has an interest in demonstrating that its international relationships are pluralistic rather than dependent on one partisan channel. Repeated high-visibility engagement with a single party can create an appearance of alignment even when the underlying relationship is narrower. That reputational issue is distinct from proof of ideological affiliation.

6. The duty attached to an IPP role

Because IPP presents itself as planning for governance after a theocratic regime, participation carries responsibilities different from ordinary activism. My writings repeatedly insist that transition leadership must be accountable, transparent, limited by law and oriented toward increasing—not replacing—the people’s capacity to choose. Applied to IPP experts, that suggests the following duties:

Role clarity: distinguish personal political opinions, academic/expert analysis, dissident advocacy and positions formally adopted by IPP.

Plural access: where feasible, engage democratic parties and institutions across the spectrum rather than allowing one party to become the exclusive gateway to Swedish politics.

Equal-citizenship consistency: avoid endorsing positions that conflict with a free and democratic Iran, regardless of whether pressure comes from allies on the right, centre or left.

Transparency: disclose relevant political collaborations, event sponsorship and institutional roles so audiences can judge possible conflicts or dependencies.

Technocratic discipline: in IPP work, privilege evidence, implementability, rule of law and measurable public benefit over partisan loyalty.

7. Reza Pahlavi’s international democratic positioning

My publications present Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s political value not merely as dynastic symbolism but as the possibility of linking Iranian national continuity with secular democracy, parliamentary government, equal citizenship and a transition whose final constitutional settlement belongs to the people. That framing creates a communications obligation for people associated with projects operating under or alongside his strategic vision: their conduct should make the pluralist content of the project visible, not merely assert it rhetorically.

This does not mean avoiding politicians who are controversial or situated on a particular side of Sweden’s political spectrum. It means that the reason for engagement should be intelligible and bounded. A meeting about Iranian transnational repression is not the same thing as adopting a Swedish party’s migration, welfare, cultural or constitutional programme. The distinction should be explicit where confusion is foreseeable.

8. Foreign-policy pragmatism without ideological dependency

A recurring theme in my work is that friendship with another state or political actor should neither be demonised as dependence nor romanticised into unconditional loyalty. The same logic used in my analysis of future Iran–Israel relations applies here: partnership should be judged by whether it advances legitimate objectives while preserving independent judgment. Friendship must not disable criticism, and opposition to one ideological camp must not automatically bind an Iranian democratic project to another.

This is also consistent with the critique of ideological dogmatism: a map is useful only if it remains corrigible when reality changes. For IPP, the practical question is therefore not “Which Swedish party is our natural ideological home?” but “Which democratic institutions and actors can contribute lawfully and transparently to the safety of Iranians, democratic transition, reconstruction and long-term relations between a free Iran and Sweden?”

9. Institutional safeguards that would reduce ambiguity

A public code of political independence stating that contributors may hold personal political views but do not bind IPP unless authorised to speak for it.

A disclosure policy for party-sponsored events, parliamentary invitations and formal advisory relationships.

A cross-party engagement policy in democratic countries, subject to relevance and feasibility, so access is not structurally monopolised by one party.

A published minimum democratic standard: equal citizenship, freedom of conscience, political pluralism, non-violence, independent courts and genuinely competitive elections.

A conflict-of-interest process for contributors whose party-political, commercial or organisational roles overlap with policy recommendations.

Clear attribution in media appearances: “personal view”, “academic/expert view”, or “IPP position”.

10. Overall analysis

The available evidence supports a careful conclusion. Arvin and Ardavan Khoshnood have meaningful and repeated cooperation with Sweden Democrat politicians in the field of Iran policy. Both are publicly identified as IPP advisers. Those roles make questions of independence, transparency and democratic consistency legitimate subjects of scrutiny. At the same time, the evidence reviewed does not justify describing either brother as an SD member or treating all their Iran-related cooperation as proof of general allegiance to SD.

Within the secular-democratic framework developed in my earlier publications, the decisive standard is not political proximity by itself. The relevant questions are whether cooperation remains compatible with equal citizenship and pluralism; whether it is transparent; whether experts retain independence; whether other democratic interlocutors remain possible; and whether IPP’s institutional work remains technocratic rather than partisan. Those criteria allow the same standard to be applied to cooperation with SD, the Moderates, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens, the Left Party or actors outside Sweden without changing the rule according to political preference.

For a movement seeking to persuade international audiences that a post-Islamic-Republic Iran would be parliamentary, secular and democratic, credibility is strengthened when the means resemble the stated end: plural engagement, transparent institutions, accountable expertise, equal rights and the visible capacity to disagree with allies as well as opponents.

Sources and documentary basis

Bakhshayesh, Peyman. “What Is Pahlavi Plus?” 2026. Author’s manuscript.

Bakhshayesh, Peyman. “Politics for People; Not People for Ideology.” 2026. Author’s manuscript.

Bakhshayesh, Peyman. “The Practice of Secular Democracy.” 25 September 2026. Author’s manuscript.

Bakhshayesh, Peyman. “The Code Name Javid Shah and the Meaning of Secular Democracy.” 27 September 2026. Author’s manuscript.

Bakhshayesh, Peyman. “Two Identity Triangles in Pahlavism.” 27 September 2026. Author’s manuscript.

Bakhshayesh, Peyman. “Iran and Israel: Beyond a Common Enemy.” 25 September 2026. Author’s English manuscript.

Iran Prosperity Project. Official website, “About the Project” and “The People Behind the Plan”. Accessed 29 September 2026.

Khoshnood, Ardavan M. Official website: biography, speeches and commentary. Accessed 29 September 2026.

Khoshnood, Arvin. Official website: talks and expert contributions. Accessed 29 September 2026.

Lund University Research Portal. Bibliographic record of the joint Svenska Dagbladet op-ed published on 16 January 2026.

Documentary sources and scope

The official IPP roster, checked on 13 October 2026, lists both brothers as advisers. The political judgments and proposed safeguards are mine; association and co-authorship do not establish party membership or an official IPP endorsement.

• IPP: official roster and project description
• Ardavan Khoshnood: public biography
• Ardavan’s account of the 19 February parliamentary briefing
• Arvin’s public record of publications and the 3 June parliamentary seminar
• Lund University: 16 January 2026 joint op-ed record