Pahlavism: Iranian Nationalism and a Secular Democratic Future — English edition

Pahlavism

Iranian nationalism and the case for a secular democratic future

Peyman Bakhshayesh MD PhD MBA

Consultant Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgeon

Political essay | 15 September 2026

Written on 15 September 2026; editorially revised on 13 October 2026. Historical claims and reference links have been checked. The essay retains its original political argument and dated survey evidence.

Iran carries a history far greater than the government that speaks in its name. Its future should be worthy of that history. For those of us who support Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the struggle is to recover the nation’s authority over its own destiny and to place Iranian talent, culture and ambition in the service of a free and flourishing country.

Pahlavism, as I understand and advocate it, is a voice of progressive Iranian nationalism. It connects national independence and historical continuity with effective institutions, secular democracy, equal citizenship and partnership with the wider world. Its promise is an Iran whose people can govern themselves, prosper through their work and meet other nations with confidence.

This is a political vision for the present and the future. It draws inspiration from the modernising ambitions of the Pahlavi era while insisting that the constitutional freedoms left insecure in the twentieth century must become the foundations of the twenty-first. The argument begins before the Pahlavi dynasty, with an Iranian demand that has outlived successive rulers: government must answer to the people.

The constitutional inheritance

The Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911 belongs at the beginning of this modern political story. The constitutional breakthrough came in 1906, when the Majles was established and the Fundamental Law adopted; the Supplementary Fundamental Laws followed in 1907. These developments gave institutional expression to demands for representative government, limits on arbitrary authority and national independence. They also opened enduring arguments about the relationship between religion, sovereignty and the law. [1,2]

The intellectual groundwork had been laid under the Qajars. Iranian reformers, students, diplomats, merchants and writers encountered new ideas through Europe, the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus and India. Travel, translation, journalism and education helped turn dissatisfaction with misgovernment into demands for public institutions. The constitutional coalition was diverse, including secular reformers and religious figures. It cannot be reduced to a single Western political doctrine. [1]

Nor was the settlement of 1906 a completed liberal democracy. Its restrictions and religious provisions reflected the conflicts of its time. Its lasting achievement was to establish a claim that could be developed beyond those limitations: political power should operate through institutions and be subject to public accountability. Modern democratic Pahlavism can inherit that claim and carry it further, through universal suffrage, political pluralism and the equal citizenship of women and men.

The connection matters because Iran’s constitutional aspirations are rooted in Iranian history. Our demand for freedom has its own language, memories and sacrifices. A future democratic constitution would continue a national argument that began generations before the Islamic Republic and that no government has the right to close.

Historical memory and the Pahlavi legacy

Cyrus the Great and the Achaemenid Empire, established in the sixth century BCE, occupy a commanding place in Iran’s historical imagination. The civilisations of the Iranian plateau reach further back still. This inheritance gives modern Iranians a profound sense of continuity, but its political value lies in what it inspires us to build. Ancient imperial achievements cannot substitute for contemporary rights or competent government. [3]

The Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled from 1925 to 1979, sought to connect national identity with the practical construction of a modern state. Under Reza Shah, central administration expanded, legal institutions were reorganised, secular education developed and major infrastructure was built. Under Mohammad Reza Shah, the state enlarged its economic planning and technical institutions. These changes helped establish the administrative and professional foundations on which a modern country depends. [4]

Women’s expanding access to education and public life was an essential part of this transformation. Women gained the vote in 1963, and the Family Protection Laws of 1967 and 1975 strengthened important protections within family life. These advances also reflected the work and demands of Iranian women themselves. Their achievements belong to the nation’s history of reform. [5]

The record also contains a central warning. State development did not secure durable democratic accountability. Royal power restricted independent political life, and compulsory unveiling under Reza Shah showed how modernisation could itself become coercive. A democratic renewal of the Pahlavi tradition must acknowledge these failures and provide institutions that prevent their repetition. [4,5]

That is the task of contemporary Pahlavism: to unite the capacity to build with the obligation to answer to citizens. An effective state needs a professional administration, reliable courts and the ability to deliver services. A free nation needs independent institutions capable of restraining that state. Iran’s future depends on securing both.

The rupture of 1979

The revolution of 1979 brought together people with sharply different expectations. Many sought political freedom, independence or social justice. The monarchy collapsed in February. On 30–31 March, voters were asked to accept or reject an Islamic Republic, before its final constitutional structure had been settled. A separate referendum in December approved a constitution that institutionalised clerical supremacy through velayat-e faqih. [6]

This sequence is crucial. Supporting the overthrow of the Shah, voting for an Islamic Republic and consenting to the institutions that subsequently consolidated power were different political acts. The March ballot did not offer a choice among fully developed constitutional alternatives. Whatever hopes people attached to its wording, the result cannot confer unlimited authority on a ruling establishment for every generation that follows.

Women recognised the danger early. Demonstrations against compulsory veiling took place on 8 March 1979, before the referendum. The restriction of women’s freedom was therefore already being contested during the revolutionary transition; coercion developed further as the new authorities consolidated their rule. [6]

Political repression also consumed people who had opposed the monarchy. The UN Special Rapporteur Javaid Rehman’s detailed findings, published in July 2024, documented grave abuses during 1981–1982 and the mass executions of political prisoners in 1988, including victims associated with leftist organisations and the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran. His report called for accountability for atrocity crimes. The rights of these victims do not depend on whether we share their politics. [7]

For democratic Pahlavism, this history establishes a binding moral obligation. A future Iran must protect peaceful political opponents, including republicans, socialists, religious conservatives and critics of the Pahlavi family. Citizens must be able to organise, challenge governments and remove them through elections. No referendum can extinguish those continuing rights, and no claim of revolutionary legitimacy can excuse their destruction.

The Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic

The world must distinguish the Iranian people from the policies of the Islamic Republic. A government possesses offices, armed forces and diplomatic representatives. A nation contains living people, diverse convictions, inherited cultures and generations still to come. The institutions of the state should serve that larger national community.

This distinction has immediate human consequences. An Iranian student seeking a university place, a surgeon treating patients abroad, an artist exhibiting work or a family hoping to travel should not be made morally responsible for the conduct of Tehran’s rulers. Criticism of state sponsorship of terrorism must never become a judgement that Iranians are a terrorist people. Nationality is not collective guilt.

The Islamic Republic’s international record deserves rigorous scrutiny. Its leadership’s hostility towards Israel has included rhetoric serious enough to draw explicit condemnation from the UN Secretary-General, including over remarks questioning the Holocaust. The US Department of State has reported Iranian support for armed groups including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. Responsibility lies with the leaders and institutions that pursue these policies. It must not be transferred to an entire people. [8,9]

Pahlavism offers an alternative account of Iran’s place in the world. We want our country recognised through its achievements, its reliability and the freedoms of its citizens. We want the name of Iran to open conversations about scientific cooperation, culture and commerce. An essential step is to let Iranians speak in their own diversity, beyond the official voice of their rulers.

Iranian identity and partnership with the West

A Western orientation, in the vision advanced here, means close engagement with the institutions and societies that can help Iran expand freedom and prosperity. It means strong diplomatic, educational, technological and commercial relationships with the United States and Europe. It means valuing open inquiry, accountable government and the legal security that allows people to invest in their future.

These principles have universal relevance. Iranian identity does not have to dissolve into another culture for Iranians to practise them. A person can speak Persian, celebrate Nowruz, cherish Iranian literature and participate fully in a modern democratic society. Our historical position between regions and civilisations gives us opportunities for exchange. It should enrich our independence.

Iranians abroad can help translate that possibility into practical relationships. Their work in hospitals, universities, businesses and the arts can connect Iran with professional networks and experience developed elsewhere. We should invite their contribution without assuming that the diaspora speaks with one political voice or that those abroad understand every need of those at home.

Within Iran, too, the desire for dignity cannot be reduced to a single lifestyle or cultural preference. An effective national movement must reach people whose views differ about faith, dress, tradition and foreign affairs. Its common ground should be the right to choose how to live, to earn a secure livelihood and to participate in decisions that shape the country.

Iran’s dignity is inherent in its people. International respect should follow from the freedom they enjoy and the contribution they make. Partnership with the West can support that future while Iran maintains its own judgement, protects its sovereignty and pursues constructive relations across the world.

A nationalism capable of making peace

The nationalism I defend is civic and inclusive. Iran belongs equally to its citizens across languages, regions, ethnicities and beliefs. Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Baha’is and people of no religion must enjoy the same legal protection. Territorial integrity becomes more secure when people experience the country as a shared home in which their rights and local needs matter.

Secular government is essential to this settlement. It protects the freedom to believe and the freedom to decline belief. Public authority must rest on constitutional law and democratic consent, with no religious qualification for full citizenship. Women must be free to determine their own dress and to participate equally in education, employment and political life.

The same principle should shape foreign relations. A democratic Iran should establish peaceful, normal relations with Israel, develop strong partnerships with the United States and Europe, and deepen cooperation with neighbouring Arab states of the Persian Gulf. It should respect the sovereignty of Lebanon and other neighbours and support security, dignity and a peaceful political future for both Israelis and Palestinians.

Iran can pursue these relationships simultaneously. Diplomatic recognition, trade and scientific cooperation can give countries durable interests in one another’s stability. Cooperation in water management, medicine, energy and transport would offer tangible benefits to communities that have endured the costs of confrontation.

The nuclear crisis and military escalation underline what is at stake. The IAEA’s September 2026 report records the Israeli and US attacks of June 2025, further attacks beginning in February 2026, and serious continuing difficulties in nuclear verification. The political task is urgent: to protect Iranian lives, fulfil Iran’s nuclear safeguards obligations and establish a government capable of securing lasting peace. [10]

Iran’s public wealth should serve the people who generate it. National priorities should include functioning hospitals, dependable infrastructure, environmental recovery and opportunities for young people. A foreign policy worthy of those priorities would measure success by the security and prosperity it brings home.

Reza Pahlavi and democratic legitimacy

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi gives this contemporary project its most recognisable name and political focus. For supporters such as me, he embodies a connection between Iran’s historical continuity, the modernising ambitions associated with his family and the possibility of a secular democratic future. I support him as a leading figure around whom a broad national transition can be organised.

His published principles include territorial integrity and national sovereignty, free elections, separation of religion and state, equal citizenship, freedom of belief and expression, political parties and women’s rights. These commitments provide a concrete basis on which supporters can explain their allegiance and on which citizens can judge his leadership. [11]

Evidence of his standing should be presented with equal care. GAMAAN’s June 2024 survey, analysed in a report published in August 2025, placed him ahead of the other opposition figures listed, with approximately 31 per cent selecting him as one of up to two preferred figures. This is a selection rate, not a share of votes in a single-choice election. The survey recruited respondents online and applied statistical weighting to represent the literate adult population inside Iran; such findings are informative but cannot replace a free national vote. They also predate the subsequent US and Israeli attacks and cannot establish how those events changed his support. [12]

A democratic movement gains strength when it welcomes that distinction. Leadership can organise a transition, offer continuity and help build trust among international partners. Lasting public authority must come from transparent constitutional procedures and the freely expressed consent of citizens. Support for Reza Pahlavi should help make that consent possible.

Iranians must be able to debate their constitutional future openly, including the choice between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The process must protect competing voices and provide credible elections. Whatever arrangement the nation freely chooses, the freedoms promised during a transition must remain enforceable after it.

Reza Pahlavi is the central living standard-bearer of Pahlavism for its supporters. Its deepest legitimacy, however, will be secured by the extent to which it empowers the Iranian people. A political tradition endures when citizens can make it their own, examine it critically and carry its institutions beyond the lifetime of any individual.

Building the Iran that freedom deserves

Political liberation must lead to a country capable of meeting ordinary human needs. A family should be able to plan its future without watching its hopes disappear into instability. A young graduate should find a reason to build a life in Iran. A patient should receive care because it is needed. A business should succeed through useful work under predictable rules.

Achieving that future will require disciplined institution building: an independent judiciary, accountable security services, transparent public finance and a professional civil service. Universities need academic freedom. Journalism needs protection. Economic recovery needs competition, reliable infrastructure, secure property rights and honest administration, alongside public services and support for those who would otherwise be left behind.

A transition must also preserve the services on which people depend. Hospitals must remain open, utilities must function and public employees must be able to do their work. Accountability for abuses should proceed through evidence and fair trials. The integrity of a new order will be tested by its treatment of people over whom it has power.

This gives progressive nationalism its practical meaning. Love of Iran becomes a duty to improve the lives of Iranians. Historical pride becomes a responsibility to restore damaged institutions and protect the country’s natural resources. International friendship becomes a means of widening opportunity. Political freedom becomes something citizens can use every day.

There is an opportunity for the world to recognise an Iran beyond its rulers, and for Iranians to articulate a future beyond permanent confrontation. That opportunity must be answered with a credible national project. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi can help give that project direction; its achievement will require the participation, courage and judgement of the people themselves.

This is the Pahlavism I stand for: an Iranian nationalism confident enough to embrace the world and democratic enough to trust its own people. It remembers the constitutional struggle, learns from the Pahlavi legacy and commits itself to equal freedom under the law. Its horizon is a sovereign, prosperous Iran at peace with its neighbours, where children inherit the country’s possibilities and have the power to shape them.

Iran has the depth of history to know who it is. Its people must now have the freedom to decide what it becomes.

References

This essay presents the author’s interpretation of democratic Pahlavism and his support for Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. References support the historical and factual discussion; the proposed political programme is the author’s argument. Survey findings are dated and do not establish a present electoral mandate.

1. Amanat A. Constitutional Revolution i Intellectual background. Encyclopaedia Iranica. 1992; updated 2018. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i/

2. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Constitutional Revolution ii Events. Historical account of the constitutional movement and the 1906–1907 settlement. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii/

3. British Museum. Ancient Iran. Collection gallery on ancient Iranian cultures and the Persian Empire. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/galleries/ancient-iran

4. Sheikholeslami A. Administration in Iran vii Pahlavi period. Encyclopaedia Iranica. 1983; updated 2018. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/administration-vii-pahlavi/

5. Sedghi H. Feminist movements iii In the Pahlavi period. Encyclopaedia Iranica. 1999; updated 2017. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/feminist-movements-iii/

6. Maloney S and Razipour K. The Iranian revolution A timeline of events. Brookings Institution. 24 January 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/

7. Rehman J. Atrocity Crimes and grave violations of human rights committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran 1981–1982 and 1988. Detailed findings of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 17 July 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/iran/20240717-SR-Iran-Findings.pdf

8. United Nations. Secretary General shocked at remarks on Israel attributed to President of Iran. Press release SG/SM/10258. 8 December 2005. Official United Nations press release. https://press.un.org/en/2005/sgsm10258.doc.htm

9. United States Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2024. Official US government assessment. Cited as an attributed government source. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2024-v6.pdf

10. International Atomic Energy Agency. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Report by the Director General. GOV/2026/50. 1 September 2026; derestricted 9 September 2026. See paragraphs 2, 13 and 16. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2026-50.pdf

11. Reza Pahlavi. About Reza Pahlavi. Official website. Fundamental Principles. Accessed 15 September 2026. A primary source for his stated commitments. https://rezapahlavi.org/en/about

12. GAMAAN. Analytical Report on Iranians’ Political Preferences in 2024. 20 August 2025. Based on the June 2024 survey. See Section Five and the linked full report for methods and limitations. https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Iranians-Political-Preferences-in-2024-GAMAAN-Report-English.pdf