Where History Was Led Astray: The October Revolution and Iran — English Edition

Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, MD, PhD, MBA
26 September 2026 · English edition revised 13 October 2026

The October Revolution, the legacy of Leninism and the question of national sovereignty in Iran; a historical argument using PESTEL, Lewin’s force-field analysis and SWOT.

Abstract

This article re-examines the legacy of the October Revolution for Iran from the perspective of national sovereignty, civil liberty and accountable development. Its central question is how, within certain strands of twentieth-century politics, the ideal of social emancipation became subordination to the interests of a foreign state, while freedom was set aside in the name of anti-imperialism. The article uses qualitative analysis of historical documents and political texts, alongside a limited comparison of reformist and revolutionary experiences. Its central argument is that the October Revolution was not the sole cause of Iran’s crisis, but that, by providing the model of the vanguard party, establishing Moscow as a political authority and prioritising international alignment, it created an important pathway through which independent national politics was weakened. At particular moments, this pathway reinforced, and was reinforced by, domestic authoritarianism, Western intervention and Islamist politics. The author’s qualitative PESTEL, force-field and SWOT assessments support the argument that overcoming this legacy requires more than rejecting the past or replacing elites. It requires linking national identity to equal rights, social justice, independent organisation and institutional safeguards for the transfer of power. The article’s support for a central role for Prince Reza Pahlavi is a political proposal conditional on the people’s free choice, pluralism and accountability, rather than a conclusion derived from a deterministic law of history. In this sense, a return to Iranian identity means restoring Iranians’ right to shape their own future.

Keywords: October Revolution; Leninism; Tudeh Party; national sovereignty; anti-imperialism; secular democracy; Prince Reza Pahlavi; PESTEL; Lewin’s Force Field Analysis; SWOT.

1. Introduction: When Iran Becomes an Instrument Rather Than the Focus of Politics

History has no predetermined course that every society must inevitably follow. Accordingly, the expression ‘history being led astray’ in this article is not a claim to have discovered a natural law. It is a judgement about departure from three criteria: the nation’s right to make independent decisions, the freedom and equality of citizens, and the capacity of institutions to correct mistakes peacefully. Whenever Iran is reduced to an arena of competition between powers, citizens to followers of an ideology, and human suffering to an acceptable cost of a political ideal, it is possible to speak of a departure from these criteria.

The article’s hypothesis is that the October Revolution’s legacy for Iran involved more than the transfer of a set of economic theories: it also transferred a way of making political judgements. Governments and movements were classified first according to their relationship with international blocs, and only afterwards were the rights of their people considered. Within this logic, when a political force was regarded as an enemy of Western power, its authoritarianism, discrimination and repression could temporarily be treated as secondary issues. The problem is not internationalism understood as solidarity among human beings on an equal footing; it is the transformation of solidarity into a hierarchy of loyalties.

In the author’s view, this shift in criteria had serious consequences for a country with a history of Russian and British intervention and a constitutionalist aspiration. Nevertheless, the distance between 1917 and later crises should not be bridged by a single, direct and unmediated line of causation. Iranians’ decisions, the structure of the state, clerical organisation, inequality and the weakness of representative institutions also shaped the outcome. The defensible claim is not that ‘the Bolsheviks created all of Iran’s subsequent history’, but that the models and dependencies emerging from October increased, under specific conditions, the costs of intellectual independence and democracy.

Central thesis: History went astray for Iran at the point when Iranians’ freedom was presented not as an independent criterion, but as subordinate to the interests of a bloc, a party or an ideology.

2. Method, Limits of the Argument, and the Use of Three Frameworks

This is an analytical and critical article based on documentary research. It is not a systematic review, a survey or a statistical estimate of the contribution of each cause. Sources were selected from original texts by Marx and Lenin, historical records, scholarship, institutional documents and human-rights reports. The argument considers evidence that supports and limits its hypothesis. The original source review ended on 26 September 2026; this publication revision, dated 13 October, preserves the historical argument and checks key references without representing the paper as a new empirical study.

Three levels are distinguished: ‘documented events’, such as the Tudeh Party’s support for the northern oil concession; ‘causal interpretations’, such as the effect of that support on the independence of national politics; and ‘normative proposals’, such as the desirability of a transition to secular democracy. This distinction prevents the author’s political preference from being presented as a conclusive scientific finding. Similarly, the official position of a party or leader is evidence of what that actor claims, not proof of its popularity or of the fulfilment of its promises in practice.

PESTEL, also known as PESTLE, organises the wider environment into six dimensions: political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal. Lewin’s Force Field Analysis focuses on the interaction between forces driving and restraining change. SWOT distinguishes internal strengths and weaknesses from external opportunities and threats. These are tools for structuring a problem, not formulas that prove the validity of a historical narrative. The tables present the author’s analysis based on the evidence introduced in the article; no numerical scores, survey findings or unmeasured causal coefficients are attributed to them. [1, 2, 3]

3. From Understanding Change to the Temptation to Engineer History

3.1. Linnaeus, Darwin, and the Limits of the Analogy Between Nature and Society

By systematising the naming and classification of living organisms, Carl Linnaeus provided an important tool for understanding biodiversity. In On the Origin of Species, published in 1859, Charles Darwin formulated common descent and natural selection as explanations for changes in living organisms. Linnaean classification should not be confused with evolutionary theory itself, and Darwin’s work was not merely a classification of animals. More importantly, biological evolution does not establish an ethical hierarchy among nations or a necessary path from one political system to another. [4, 5]

Nor is intellectual history a simple chain running from Linnaeus to Darwin and then to Marx. The materialist conception of history was already developing in the works of Marx and Engels before Darwin’s book appeared. In his 1859 Preface, Marx explained the relationship between productive forces, relations of production and social transformation, and identified his critical engagement with Hegel’s philosophy of right as part of his research trajectory. The importance of this approach lay in its attention to the actual relations of social life, not in conferring scientific authority on every force claiming to represent the future. [6, 7]

3.2. Marx’s Contribution and the Error of Turning Theory into a Definitive Verdict

Marx and Engels opened new horizons by connecting political economy, history and social criticism. Marx’s emphasis on changing the world in the Theses on Feuerbach brought philosophy closer to questions of action and social responsibility. Yet there is a fundamental difference between ‘the need to change unjust social relations’ and ‘a party’s exclusive right to define justice’. The former can provide a basis for criticising power; the latter, without mechanisms of accountability, can become a new form of domination. This distinction is the foundation of the present critique, rather than a denial of the intellectual value of the entire Marxist tradition. [8]

Marx’s theory of crisis should likewise not be reduced to complete industrial saturation or a countdown to the collapse of capitalism. In Volume III of Capital, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is examined alongside counteracting influences. The issue is the interaction of tendencies and counter-tendencies, not a guarantee of revolution at a particular moment. This analysis does not establish that every economic crisis will, by itself, generate democratic awareness, independent organisation or better government. [9, 10]

3.3. Marx, Russia, and the Leninist Turn

The claim that Marx was categorically opposed to revolution in Russia is inconsistent with his later writings. In his 1881 letter to Vera Zasulich, he did not present Western Europe’s historical trajectory as the inevitable destiny of every society. In their 1882 Russian Preface to the Manifesto, Marx and Engels also outlined a conditional possibility: a Russian revolution, if complemented by proletarian revolution in the West, might open the way to a different form of transformation. This position was neither an advance endorsement of the Soviet state nor an absolute rejection of revolution in Russia. [11, 7]

In the April Theses of 1917, Lenin proposed moving from the first stage of the revolution to another stage and transferring power to the soviets. In October of that year, amid war and a crisis of government, the Bolsheviks seized power. The formal designation ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ dates from its establishment in 1922. The precise formulation is therefore ‘the Russian October Revolution and the legacy of the Soviet state’, rather than a revolution in a country already called the Soviet Union. Lenin’s political innovation should be explained in terms of organisation and the use of a particular historical opportunity, rather than simply as the direct implementation of Marx’s writings. [12, 13]

The article’s critique focuses on an institutional danger: the substitution of the party for the class, party leaders for society, and organisational loyalty for independent judgement. This danger is not confined to one ideology. Any force that considers itself the embodiment of the nation, religion or history, while leaving citizens no effective means of dissent, faces the same problem. Opposition to Leninism is therefore consistent only when it entails opposition to every form of political tutelage, rather than merely changing the identity of the guardian.

4. Iran in the Shadow of the Northern Power: Ideological Rupture and Continuity of Interests

4.1. Before October: Constitutionalism and the Shared Responsibility of Autocracy and Intervention

Threats to Iran’s national sovereignty did not begin with the October Revolution. In June 1908, the constitutional parliament was attacked by the Cossack Brigade under the command of Vladimir Liakhov. This event must be understood through the connection between Tsarist Russian support and Mohammad Ali Shah’s decision to suppress constitutionalism. The Russian officer’s role does not remove the responsibility of the reigning monarch or domestic anti-constitutionalist forces. This example illustrates how foreign intervention commonly operates through domestic divisions and collaboration. [14, 15]

After October, the language of legitimacy changed: claims about the liberation of nations replaced the overt language of empire. The analytical question is how far this change altered the exercise of power. The answer cannot be inferred from a state’s description as ‘socialist’ or ‘anti-colonial’; its specific decisions, agreements and interventions must be examined. Criticism of Soviet policy is also a critique of a state and a mechanism of power, not the attribution of an inherent characteristic to the Russian people.

4.2. The 1945 Document and the Test of Independence from Moscow

The Soviet Politburo’s secret directive of 6 July 1945 on establishing a movement in northern Iran provides direct evidence of intervention. The text proposes preparations for an autonomous region with broad powers within Iran, the organisation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the expansion of activity in other northern provinces, and the provision of propaganda and financial resources. The document’s use of separatist language should not be equated with proof of a settled plan for the immediate annexation of all these territories. Nevertheless, organised interference by a foreign state in Iranian politics is clear. [16]

This document does not invalidate the cultural and linguistic rights of the people of Azerbaijan or Kurdistan. A local demand can be genuine and legitimate while a foreign power simultaneously seeks to use it as an instrument of its own policy. Democratic nationalism must distinguish these two levels: defending the country’s territorial integrity without denying citizens’ equality, and supporting local rights without surrendering political agency to a foreign state. Attributing collective treachery to an ethnic group repeats the same exclusion of citizens from politics.

4.3. The Tudeh Party, Northern Oil, and the Independent Left

The Tudeh Party was founded in 1941 and advanced demands such as labour rights, social reform and women’s political rights. Its social base and motivations therefore cannot be reduced to foreign dependence. Nevertheless, the party’s public support in October 1944 for the Soviet request for a northern oil concession is a prominent example of privileging bloc alignment over a consistent standard of independence. The assumption that a socialist state could not, by definition, act in a colonial manner limited the possibility of criticising that state’s actual conduct. [17]

Writing from within the left-wing tradition, Fred Halliday also identified dependence on Soviet policy as a fundamental problem in the Tudeh Party’s record. His discussion of Khalil Maleki’s break with the party and efforts to develop an independent socialism shows that a choice between social justice and national independence was not inevitable. An appropriate critique therefore targets the kind of party loyalty that suspended independent judgement about Iran’s interests, rather than every labour demand or every socialist idea. [18]

Conversely, a consistent commitment to independence cannot overlook Western intervention. The official documents published by the US Department of State on Iran between 1951 and 1954 provide an essential basis for examining the American role in the overthrow of Mosaddegh’s government in 1953. Recalling this intervention does not absolve the Soviet Union; it establishes a consistent criterion. Neither East nor West acquires the right to determine Iran’s future simply by virtue of its name, ideology or alliance. [19]

5. Europe and the United States: Why Was Reform a Real Alternative to Revolution?

The experience of European reformism challenges the assumption of a necessary conflict between social justice and democracy. The German Social Democratic Party’s 1959 Godesberg Programme connected freedom, justice and solidarity with pluralism and the rejection of communist dictatorship. It also made room for markets, competition and different forms of ownership. Its central significance was not that it resolved every contradiction, but that it accepted the principle that justice should not be pursued at the cost of eliminating freedom and political competition. [20]

In Britain, the Beveridge Report of 1942 proposed a programme to address social insecurity. Welfare reforms cannot be understood solely as a product of fear of the Soviet Union: workers’ organisation, electoral competition, the experience of war and different traditions of social reform also played a part. The lesson relevant to Iran is not to imitate one country mechanically, but to recognise the importance of institutionalising the possibility of change without destroying the rules of coexistence. [21]

The survival of constitutional monarchies in some European countries shows that the label ‘monarchy’ is not, by itself, an obstacle to democracy, just as the name ‘republic’ does not, by itself, produce democracy. The determining factors are limits on power, accountable government, genuine representation and the rights of opponents. This comparison does not establish the automatic legitimacy of any dynasty or constitutional model. Instead, it replaces judgement based on labels with the need to assess institutions. Sweden provides an example of the limitation of a monarch’s political power within a parliamentary framework. [22]

The United States likewise did not manage crises simply by freeing capitalism from every constraint. The Social Security Act of 1935 is an example of an expansion of public responsibility within a capitalist system. Explaining American economic power in terms of a ‘selected generation of Europeans’ is analytically inadequate and, understood biologically, unjustified. A sound analysis must examine institutions, resources, migration, investment, knowledge and historical circumstances, rather than the natural superiority of a population. [23]

6. The 1979 Revolution: Convergence Against the Shah, Not Agreement on Freedom

In the author’s view, defending the Pahlavis’ record of development is compatible with acknowledging the political shortcomings of that period. The expansion of the modern state and social modernisation do not, in themselves, replace independent institutions, political participation or the possibility of reforming the exercise of power. Theda Skocpol’s analysis of the rentier state and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution reminds us that explaining 1979 requires simultaneous attention to state structure, social transformation and the capacity for religious mobilisation. Reducing the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy to a ‘left-wing conspiracy’ fails to explain why such a coalition was able to succeed. [24]

Nevertheless, criticism of the limitations of Pahlavi rule should not absolve revolutionary forces of responsibility for their choices. From the perspective of this article, the error of part of the left was to place opposition to foreign dependence ahead of examining the content of the future political order. When political forces relinquish power without guarantees for party freedoms, women’s rights, judicial independence and free choice, victory over the previous ruler can become a defeat for citizens. The issue is not simply whether the actors’ intentions were good or bad; it concerns enforceable commitments and the consequences of decisions.

Chronological precision is necessary here. The Organisation of Iranian People’s Fedaian (Majority) emerged following the split of June 1980, after the revolution. A distinction must therefore be drawn between the Fedaian’s role before the revolution and the positions adopted by the Majority in the early years of the Islamic Republic. The support of the Tudeh Party and the Majority for what they regarded as the government’s anti-imperialist character, alongside the opposition of other left-wing currents, demonstrates a genuine division. The subsequent repression of these same organisations neither justifies their earlier support nor reduces the government’s responsibility for repressing them. [25]

Islamism was not a branch of communism either. Religious forces had their own organisations, sources of legitimacy and independent objectives. The convergence of parts of the left and Islamist forces in opposition to the Shah or the United States was neither a permanent alliance nor an ideological identity. A more precise description is ‘a temporary convergence of heterogeneous forces with asymmetrical institutional consequences’: all contributed to weakening the previous order, but they did not acquire equal power or an equal right to survive in the new one. [24, 25]

The common feature open to criticism is the prioritisation of an abstract collective over the actual human being: class and party in one account, the ummah and clerical guardianship in another. Article 11 of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution emphasises the unity of the Islamic ummah, while Article 110 lists extensive powers for the Supreme Leader. The mere presence of the concept of the ummah does not automatically establish a rejection of national interests. The problem arises when transnational decisions or religious claims are placed beyond citizens’ scrutiny and choice. [26]

RAND’s study of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ domestic role describes its expansion from a military organisation into political, social and economic spheres. From this perspective, the expression ‘Islamist oligarchy’ in this article refers to the concentration of access to power, resources and immunity within limited networks. It does not mean that every religious person or every government employee belongs to such a network. Slogans about supporting the oppressed do not substitute for tests of ownership transparency, economic competition and financial accountability. Nor does a report from 2009, on its own, justify stating these networks’ precise share of today’s economy. [27]

7. Dey 1404 (December 2025–January 2026): Testing the Sincerity of Universal Human Rights

In its report of 23 January 2026, Amnesty International documented widespread killings of protesters and bystanders on 8 and 9 January, corresponding to 18 and 19 Dey 1404, followed by arrests, communications shutdowns and pressure on families. The report also describes incursions into healthcare settings and concerns for the injured and medical personnel. Disagreement over the final estimate of casualties is not a reason to deny the occurrence of this widespread violence. Nevertheless, this article does not present an unverified final death toll. [28]

From the perspective of a trauma surgeon, before any geopolitical interpretation comes the injured body, the bereaved family and the right to treatment. The value of an injured person’s life should not depend on their slogans, their preference for monarchy or republic, or their position on the United States and Israel. The same principle applies to victims of the actions of any other state. Human rights are universal only when they cannot be suspended in favour of ‘our own camp’.

However, the available documentation does not support the claim that ‘all human rights organisations have remained silent’. On 8 July 2026, Amnesty International also criticised the absence of effective action towards international justice after the January killings. The important distinction is between an absence of condemnation and an absence of effective action. A more precise demand directed at governments and institutions is that they explain the gap between reporting and accountability, support victims and prevent recurrence. [29]

Likewise, attributing the same policy of accommodation to all of Oxford, Cambridge or Harvard, without a dataset and a clear definition, is not a research finding. What can be studied are the specific writings and positions of individuals, centres and intellectual networks. Nor does opposition to war or broad-based sanctions, by itself, establish support for the Islamic Republic. Criticism should focus on the denial of repression, the justification of discrimination or the subordination of Iranians’ rights to state interests, rather than mere disagreement over instruments of foreign policy.

‘Selective anti-imperialism’ is the term this article uses for this inconsistency of standards: opposing domination by one power while overlooking domination by another power or domestic autocracy. This concept must be assessed through evidence of conduct, not used as a label to exclude all critics of the West. Iranians’ right to change their government is as independent of Moscow’s preferences as it is of the calculations of Washington, London or any other capital.

8. PESTEL Analysis: The Environment That Shapes Political Choices

PESTEL is used here to identify the external conditions affecting the project of a national transition to secular democracy. This framework must not erase differences between historical periods: today’s digital media cannot be treated as a cause of events in 1944. The historical dimension traces how the problem emerged; the strategic dimension presents the author’s current proposals for addressing it. The water crisis is also an example of a material problem that a purely ideological analysis can miss. Kaveh Madani’s research emphasises the roles of management, agriculture and the development model in this crisis. [1, 30]

Table 1. PESTEL analysis of a national transition to secular democracy: the author’s qualitative analysis

The table points to a warning: changing the name of the government without changing the relationship between power, wealth and rights does not resolve the problem. Conversely, a programme that explains freedom, continuity of services and justice together can reduce the gap between the desire for change and confidence in the future. Linking nationalism to quality of life brings it closer to a programme of government, rather than mere nostalgia.

9. Lewin’s Force Field Analysis: Why Does Dissatisfaction Not Automatically Produce a Transition?

In Lewin’s field-based approach, the existing situation arises from the interaction of forces. Caution is needed in applying this approach politically: society is not a closed laboratory, and its forces are not fixed, independent or fully measurable. With this qualification, a heuristic formulation can be used to structure questions. The following expression is neither a formula for predicting revolution nor an equation taken directly from Lewin’s article. [2]

B(t) = Σ wiDi(t) − Σ vjRj(t)

In this proposed representation, D denotes the intensity of forces driving the transition, R the intensity of restraining forces, and w and v their context-dependent weights. The balance B is only a concise way of organising hypotheses. This article contains no data with which to assign numerical values to these variables. A hypothetically positive balance therefore predicts neither the timing of a collapse nor the probability of success. Interactions between the forces, as well as the government’s response, may also alter the outcome.

Table 2. Force field analysis: a focus on reducing fear and building trust

The table’s strategic message is that intensifying anger is not the only way to increase the possibility of change. Reducing fear about the aftermath of change, clarifying the rules and guaranteeing opponents’ rights may be more effective and less costly. A distinction must be drawn between decision-makers responsible for rights violations and employees who played no part in them. This distinction is neither immunity for criminal conduct nor an invitation to collective revenge.

In assessing the force field, the appropriate question is not ‘Why are people not angry enough?’, but ‘What has created a gap between dissatisfaction and confidence in an alternative?’ Possible answers include weak cooperation, uncertainty about the economic programme or fear of renewed authoritarianism. These are hypotheses requiring research, not characteristics to be attributed to the entire population without evidence.

10. SWOT Analysis: The Capacities and Vulnerabilities of a Secular-Democratic Alternative

The unit of analysis in this SWOT exercise is a ‘potential national, secular-democratic coalition’, not the entire Iranian population or an individual leader. Prince Reza Pahlavi’s central role in this assessment is the author’s proposal for coordination. The table discusses the possibilities and risks associated with this project; it does not assume that all the strengths or opportunities already exist in an organised form. The distinction between internal and external factors is also made in relation to this unit of analysis. [3]

Table 3. SWOT analysis of a national coalition: a conditional assessment, not a numerical measure of popularity

10.1. Turning the Table into Strategic Choices

Strength–opportunity strategy: Translate the symbolic capacity of leadership and professional expertise into a public, multilingual programme that clarifies rights, the economy and foreign relations. Its message should not simply be ‘We oppose the Islamic Republic’; it should explain how an elected government would protect citizens, investment, health and peace.

Strength–threat strategy: To counter narratives of dependence or monopoly, apply within the coalition the same rules sought for the future government: financial transparency, respect for criticism, disclosure of conflicts of interest and opposition to attacks on civilians. National credibility is not built through secrecy about foreign support or the exclusion of those who ask questions.

Weakness–opportunity strategy: Use access to international knowledge and experience to develop plans for interim administration, transitional justice and the restoration of services. Advice, however, must not replace the people’s decisions. Responsibility for each proposal and its source of funding should be identified, and programmes should be open to expert scrutiny before becoming public commitments.

Weakness–threat strategy: Avoid promises of immediate collapse, claims to exclusive representation and the imposition of political uniformity. The coalition must establish rules for legitimate disagreements and adverse circumstances alike. A programme written only for the day of victory, while remaining silent about disagreement, delay or service disruption, is vulnerable.

11. Prince Reza Pahlavi and the Meaning of a Return to National Sovereignty

The author supports a central role for Prince Reza Pahlavi in coordinating a transition to a national, secular and democratic government. In his official statement of January 2026, Prince Reza Pahlavi discussed secular-democratic government, institutional accountability, normalisation of relations with the United States, recognition of Israel and economic cooperation with the world. This text establishes his stated position; it does not, by itself, demonstrate the level of public support or the future fulfilment of those commitments. [31]

This article proposes that such leadership should be defined as a responsibility to facilitate the people’s choice, not as a substitute for it. The historical standing of the Pahlavi name and the memory of modernisation may carry positive meaning for part of society, but the legitimacy of future rule must arise from a free and fair process. Constitutional monarchy may be the author’s preferred option; a secular republic must also have an equal right to compete. The outcome of that competition cannot be appropriated in advance in the name of history.

Five institutional commitments distinguish this proposal from a personality-centred approach: a temporary and limited mandate for transitional leadership; oversight by a pluralist and accountable structure; public disclosure of decisions and financial resources; a clear process for drafting a constitution and freely choosing the form of government; and the termination of transitional powers when elected institutions are established. The detailed timetable must be determined in accordance with actual conditions and rules subject to oversight, rather than through indefinite extension of a state of emergency.

A common charter must also guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, equality between women and men, cultural and linguistic rights, judicial independence, and the rights to organise and compete politically. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides an established basis for such principles. These rights are not privileges reserved for supporters of the transition: they must also be enjoyed by those who oppose the proposed leader or the preferred form of government. [32]

Within this framework, returning to Iranian identity does not mean restoring society to a frozen image of the past. A nationally sovereign Iran is the home of all Iranians, not merely one political tendency, religion or language. Recovering a legacy of development and national dignity can help shape the future only when accompanied by the freedom to criticise that same legacy. Repeating the formula of ‘one truth, one leader, one permitted voice’, even under national symbols, would not be a democratic response to the experiences of Leninism and clerical guardianship.

Foreign support should likewise serve to protect rights and expand the scope for choice, rather than establish ownership over Iran’s future. Cooperation with the United States, Israel, Europe and other countries can be pursued on the basis of mutual interests and peace, but such cooperation does not automatically legitimise any action harmful to civilians. Independent patriotism distances itself both from ideological isolation and from unconditional dependence.

12. Improving Public and International Understanding: From Slogans to Standards

12.1. Freeing History from Bloc-Based Narratives

Public education in history should strengthen the ability to compare conduct, rather than divide the world into invariably virtuous friends and invariably evil enemies. The northern oil concession should be studied alongside the intervention of 1953; the achievements of modernisation alongside political restrictions; and the left’s errors alongside the persecution of its members. The aim is not to equate all responsibilities, but to develop independent judgement and prevent political immunity for ‘our own side’.

12.2. Establishing a Consistent Standard for Human Rights and Social Justice

Dialogue with international public opinion should begin with Iranians’ rights and lived experience: security, freedom, healthcare and the right to choose. A government’s opposition to the West cannot substitute for answers to questions about imprisonment, discrimination or poverty. Domestically, a programme for freedom must also explain labour rights, support for vulnerable people and equitable access to services. Leaving social justice as the exclusive preserve of left-wing or religious discourse is as mistaken as surrendering the concept of the nation to authoritarianism.

12.3. Turning Criticism of Universities and the Media into Reproducible Research

To test the claim that insufficient attention has been paid to victims in Iran, the article proposes an independent content-analysis study. The period of study, for example from 28 December 2025 to 26 September 2026, should be specified in advance. Universities, centres, authors and types of text should be distinguished, and searches should use consistent terms. The unit of analysis could be a statement, commentary or public event. This is a proposed study design; it has not been carried out in this article.

Coding should distinguish condemnation of repression, verifiable silence within a complete corpus, explicit justification of the government, opposition to war and criticism of sanctions policy. Two independent assessors, clear coding rules and reporting of the level of agreement would strengthen the findings. Any claim of ‘less attention’ also requires a defined denominator and comparator. Raw counts of a few publications, or personal experience of an academic environment, are insufficient grounds for generalisation to an entire institution.

12.4. Assessing Confidence in an Alternative Through Evidence

Alongside public education, the quality of the alternative itself needs to be assessed. Has a charter protecting opponents’ rights been published? Are responsibilities, funding sources and methods of dispute resolution clear? Does the programme for public services identify costs and responsible bodies? Does public consultation actually lead to revisions? These questions are more useful for assessing preparedness to govern than follower counts or supporters’ applause. Measuring public support also requires a valid methodology, reporting of limitations and avoidance of generalising from self-selected samples to society as a whole.

Three proposed implementation horizons could structure this work. The first would involve preparing a minimum common charter and transparency standards; the second, public evaluation of plans for interim administration and social protection; and the third, preparing the legal rules for elections and the transfer of authority. These horizons are not guaranteed stages of history and should not be used to postpone the people’s right to choose indefinitely. Progress should be measured by the publication of assessable commitments and the possibility of revising them, rather than simply by increasingly heroic rhetoric.

13. Limitations and Responses to the Main Criticisms

First, comparing a number of events does not make it possible to calculate the October Revolution’s numerical contribution to the present crisis. The long time span, multiple causal factors and absence of an observable counterfactual make a single-cause claim unjustified. This article advances a hypothesis about an influential mechanism; assessing its scope requires more archival research and more systematic comparison. Memories, slogans and quotations without a verifiable primary source should not replace documentary evidence.

Second, labour rights and some of the left’s intellectual contributions cannot be erased from history. Nor do the errors of an organisation’s leaders justify discrediting all its members or excusing their repression. The critique advanced here remains ethically consistent only if it recognises the right of the democratic left, republicans, monarchists and other peaceful political currents to operate freely in a future political order.

Third, sources are written for different purposes and have different limitations. A party text, a government document, a human rights report and an academic analysis are not interchangeable. A statement of position does not measure popularity; a historical report does not necessarily measure current conditions; and failure to find evidence in a limited search is not proof that no evidence exists. PESTEL, force field analysis and SWOT do not eliminate uncertainty either: they simply organise it and make it open to discussion.

Fourth, the desirability of a national, secular and democratic government does not establish the exclusive eligibility of one individual or the necessity of a particular form of government. The author’s support for Prince Reza Pahlavi is a political choice that must be tested against performance, institutional commitments and acceptance of the people’s vote. It is precisely for this reason that the proposal distances itself from the model of a party or leader immune to criticism.

14. Conclusion: Restoring the Right to Shape the Future

The October Revolution was not the source of all Iran’s misfortunes. Yet its legacy within parts of Iranian politics contributed to a dangerous displacement: from nation to bloc, from citizen to follower, and from measurable freedom to a promise of future emancipation. Support for Soviet interests in the name of internationalism, and tolerance of authoritarianism in the name of anti-imperialism, are historical examples of this displacement. At the same time, domestic autocracy, Western intervention and Islamism’s independent power also bear responsibility for shaping Iran’s trajectory. None can be concealed behind the others.

The lesson of reformist experience and the three analytical frameworks is that democracy cannot be achieved merely by rejecting an enemy. National identity must be linked to equal rights, a productive economy to social protection, and political leadership to legal limits. An alternative unable to speak clearly about justice, public services and the right to dissent risks reproducing the past, even with the best of intentions.

Within this outlook, Prince Reza Pahlavi could, under the author’s political proposal, play a central role in bringing together forces seeking a transition, provided that the result is greater freedom of choice for Iranians. A future national government should be neither a branch of a global bloc, nor an arm of a religious apparatus, nor the private property of a political current. History returns to a more humane course when Iran once again becomes the focus of politics, and Iranians become equal holders of the right to decide its future.

Returning to one’s roots should mean reclaiming Iranians’ right to build a free, nationally sovereign and accountable future.

References

In-text citations correspond to the numbered entries below. Original hyperlinks are preserved. The theoretical sources explain historical arguments and methods; they do not estimate present-day political support. The 1945 directive is cited through a republication of an archival translation, not a claim to have examined its original manuscript. The source-review date in the original English edition was 26 September 2026.

[1] CIPD. (2025). PESTLE analysis. Factsheet, 21 March 2025. Source / DOI

[2] Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change. Human Relations, 1(1), 5–41. doi:10.1177/001872674700100103. Source / DOI

[3] CIPD. (2026). SWOT analysis. Factsheet, 20 May 2026. Source / DOI

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