قدرت سیاسی، بایدها و نبایدها — نسخهٔ انگلیسی

Political Power: What to Do and What to Avoid

A Constructive Critique of Authority-Centred and Human-Rights-Centred Strategies in the Lion and Sun Movement and Iran’s Transition to Secular Democracy

From the Unfinished Constitutional Ideal to Accountable Leadership, National Reconciliation, and the Rule of Law

Peyman Bakhshayesh

Consultant Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgeon | MD, PhD, MBA

August 2026 | Updated to 9 August 2026

Originally completed on 9 August 2026; editorially revised on 13 October 2026. Contemporary examples and political assessments retain the original August horizon.

Abstract

This article asks how the political power required to move Iran beyond the Islamic Republic and establish a secular democracy should be built, constrained, and legitimised. Its central argument is that durable power in a democratic transition arises not from historical anger, monopolisation of national symbols, dependence on foreign attack, or displays of personal loyalty, but from six combined elements: capacity to protect the population, human-rights legitimacy, social organisation, institutional preparedness, international credibility, and an inclusive public narrative. It compares an authority-centred, backward-looking tendency with a pragmatic, human-rights-centred tendency and concludes that Reza Pahlavi can play an important role in coordination and national reconciliation provided that his mandate is temporary, contractual, accountable, and subordinate to the people’s right freely to choose their future form of government.

Keywords: political power; Constitutional Revolution; Islamic Republic; secular democracy; Lion and Sun movement; Reza Pahlavi; human rights; national reconciliation; transitional justice; democratic transition.

Central thesis: Democratic power is legitimate when it can displace a repressive regime while simultaneously binding itself to rights, the rule of law, time limits, and a free popular vote. A power that can prevail but cannot limit itself is not yet democratic power.

Introduction: The Problem of Power after a Century of Striving for the Rule of Law

From the Constitutional Revolution to the present, Iranians have repeatedly sought the rule of law, a predictable judiciary, a transparent tax system, administrative division of labour, universal education, industry, infrastructure, secure property rights, and meaningful citizen participation. Ancient history and imperial memory cannot substitute for modern institutions. A country becomes advanced when personal power is transformed into power constrained by law and state capacity serves citizens’ rights.

Modern Iranian history can be read as a contest between national sovereignty and public law on one side, and claims to privileged authority by monarch, clergy, vanguard party, armed institution, or charismatic leader on the other. The Constitutional Revolution opened the way to parliament and law but left unresolved compromises over clerical supervision. The Pahlavi state advanced state-building and modernisation but concentrated power and restricted political competition. The 1979 Revolution created a system in which popular choice became subject to the supervision and veto of religious institutions (Afary, 1996; Abrahamian, 2008; Ansari, 2007).

After more than four decades of domestic repression, ideological projection, proxy networks, transnational terrorism, nuclear and missile crises, economic erosion, and regional confrontation, the question is not simply how the Islamic Republic might end. It is how an alternative force would acquire power, prevent state collapse, treat opponents and employees of the former regime, and guarantee that liberating power would not itself become unlimited power.

For a substantial section of the opposition, Reza Pahlavi has become a symbol of national continuity, secularism, connection with the wider world, and the possibility of organising a transition. Symbolic capital, however, is not equivalent to exclusive representation of a nation. The polling cited below indicates significant but not universal support, and measuring opinion under authoritarian conditions is difficult (GAMAAN, 2026; Reuters, 2026). Leadership should rest on performance, accountability, coalition-building, a credible programme, and readiness to transfer authority to elected institutions.

Method and Analytical Framework

The method is historical-institutional and normative. The article draws on scholarship on the Constitutional Revolution, the Pahlavi state, the 1979 Revolution, and the Islamic Republic; classic literature on power, authoritarian transition, civil resistance, and transitional justice; and contemporary human-rights reports, official documents, UK parliamentary reports, GAMAAN polling, and Reuters reporting.

Independent academic and human-rights sources, legal and institutional documents, and official political statements are deliberately distinguished. Official statements show what an actor says he intends to do; they do not independently prove capacity, popularity, or implementation.

Events in 2026 have unfolded rapidly and some remain difficult to verify. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that thousands of protesters and bystanders were killed on 8 and 9 January, while higher figures have also been advanced. Until independent data with transparent methodology are available, this article uses the conservative formulation 'thousands' (Amnesty International, 2026a, 2026b; Human Rights Watch, 2026).

1. The Constitutional Revolution: The Ideal of Law and the Contradiction of Clerical Supervision

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911 established a parliament and constitutional monarchy and represented one of the region’s earliest efforts to transform subjects into citizens and royal command into public law (Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2013). Its core demands were justice, law, and fiscal accountability.

Article 2 of the 1907 Supplementary Fundamental Laws stipulated that parliamentary legislation could not contradict Islam and provided for clerical review. Yet the same text also contained equality before law, protection of life and property, prohibition of punishment without law, relative press freedom, and the popular origin of state powers. Two sources of authority therefore stood side by side: the will of the nation and clerical guardianship (Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 1907).

The Islamic Republic institutionalised this contradiction in favour of velayat-e faqih. Article 4 of the revised 1989 Constitution makes laws subject to Islamic criteria and empowers the Guardian Council’s jurists to judge conformity; the Council also controls candidate eligibility (Constitute Project, 1989; House of Commons Library, 2026a).

The lesson is that secularism means establishing equal citizens and rights-constrained public law as the final source of political legitimacy. Freedom of religion must be complete, but no cleric, monarch, party, or commander should stand beyond legal oversight and public consent. The Lion and Sun is strongest as a national symbol when it remains inclusive rather than the exclusive property of one faction.

2. Pahlavi State-Building: Genuine Achievements and the Necessity of Honest Critique

The Pahlavi state brought profound changes in administrative centralisation, the national army, judiciary, civil registration, public education, universities, railways, banking, infrastructure, industrialisation, and women’s social participation. Under Mohammad Reza Shah, urbanisation, higher education, industry, and social reform expanded considerably (Abrahamian, 2008; Ansari, 2007; Milani, 2011).

State-building and economic development are not synonymous with democracy. Concentration of power in the court, restrictions on parties and the press, SAVAK’s repression of opponents, non-competitive elections, and the single-party Rastakhiz system were significant weaknesses. Political restrictions and rights violations should not be denied by comparison with the much greater violence of the Islamic Republic.

A confident defence of the Pahlavi legacy should acknowledge evidence and victims’ suffering, provide historical context without justification, and explain institutional guarantees intended to prevent repetition. The objective should not be to reproduce the political relationships of the 1970s, but to use the experience of state-building, civic nationalism, development, and global integration to build a system that surpasses the past in liberty, parliamentary oversight, judicial independence, and minority rights.

3. The 1979 Revolution and the Institutionalisation of Ideological Supremacy

The 1979 Revolution was produced by a heterogeneous coalition: clerical and bazaar networks, national and liberal forces, Marxist and guerrilla groups, students, intellectuals, and actors with very different visions of the future. Their common denominator was opposition to the monarchy, not agreement over a constitution, individual rights, economics, or the relationship between religion and state. The organisational strength of mosques and clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini’s charismatic authority, and the weakness of a common programme among other forces enabled Islamists rapidly to capture revolutionary institutions and eliminate competitors (Abrahamian, 1982; Moaddel, 1993).

It does not follow that every cleric, leftist, Mojahed, nationalist, or participant in the revolution is permanently an enemy of the nation. Political and criminal responsibility must be individual, conduct-based, and provable. Many leftists, liberals, and dissenting clerics themselves became victims of imprisonment, execution, and exile.

The Islamic Republic confines elections within a superior ideological framework. The Supreme Leader dominates security and foreign policy, while the Guardian Council screens candidates and reviews legislation. Reformism therefore faces a structural ceiling (Constitute Project, 1989; House of Commons Library, 2026a). Falling participation, candidate exclusion, repression, and the inability of reformist governments to alter the main centres of power have disillusioned much of society. Freedom House’s 2026 report continued to classify Iran as 'Not Free', with a score of 10/100 (Freedom House, 2026).

Transition requires changing fundamental rules, not merely rotating factions. Regime change must not mean state collapse, destruction of the bureaucracy, or dismissal of all public employees. Hospitals, electricity, water, banking, education, civil registration, and local administration must be preserved and de-ideologised.

4. The January 2026 Rupture and the Test of War

Protests beginning on 28 December 2025 followed a sharp fall in the currency, inflation, failures in public services, and severe economic hardship, and quickly developed into nationwide demands for fundamental political change. On 8 and 9 January, security forces used firearms, pellets, and internet shutdowns while thousands of protesters and bystanders were killed. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch described an exceptionally severe escalation of lethal repression (Amnesty International, 2026a; Human Rights Watch, 2026).

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel began attacks against Iran, with stated objectives including regime change and targeting nuclear and missile capabilities. A conditional ceasefire was announced on 8 April and subsequent negotiations continued. The UK House of Commons Library cautioned that casualty figures and many operational details were difficult to verify in wartime and under media restrictions (House of Commons Library, 2026b).

The conjunction created two dangers: the government could intensify repression under cover of wartime conditions, while parts of the opposition could assume that foreign military blows would automatically produce rapid collapse and transfer of power. Comparative transition studies show that weakening coercive capacity can create an opportunity, but without domestic organisation, elite splits, administrative planning, and social legitimacy, the same opening can produce disorder, renewed authoritarianism, or external dependency (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Opposition to the Islamic Republic cannot justify indifference to civilians, schools, hospitals, water and electricity networks, or Iran’s territorial integrity. External support is most legitimate when it protects people through communications access, treatment for the injured, targeted sanctions on perpetrators, judicial accountability, diplomatic pressure, and restrictions on tools of repression. War must not eclipse the killing of citizens and their right to determine their government (Amnesty International, 2026b).

5. Political Power: From Domination to Legitimate Capacity

Robert Dahl defined power in terms of the capacity of A to make B do something B would not otherwise do. Max Weber distinguished power from forms of legitimate authority; Steven Lukes emphasised agenda-setting and the shaping of preferences; Hannah Arendt distinguished collective power from violence (Dahl, 1957; Weber, 1978; Lukes, 2005; Arendt, 1970).

For Iran’s transition, supporters, media presence, or backing from a foreign government are not enough. A movement must coordinate citizens, encourage defections from repression, preserve essential services, announce temporary rules, and demonstrate that after victory it will continue to respect the rights of opponents.

Authority-centred politics tends to emphasise domination, command, and narrative mobilisation while treating legitimacy, coalition, institutions, and constraints as secondary. Human-rights-centred politics may be stronger in legitimacy and international credibility, but without organisation and institutional preparedness it can fail at the moment of crisis. The desired strategy combines both: ethics without organisation is insufficient; organisation without ethics is dangerous.

A proactive posture toward the world should mean narrative initiative, not violence or threats. Rather than remaining permanently on the defensive about the past, supporters of the Pahlavi project should move the discussion toward the future: freeing prisoners, ending executions, protecting minorities, Gulf security, a competitive economy, environmental responsibility, health, and elections.

6. Two Strategies within the Lion and Sun Movement

6.1 The Authority-Centred and Backward-Looking Tendency

Some monarchists interpret the 1979 Revolution principally as a revolt produced by a conspiracy among Western powers, Islamists, and the left. In this narrative, restoration of the Pahlavi legacy becomes not merely a political choice but recovery of a historical right, and opponents can easily be treated as traitors or accomplices in national catastrophe. This tendency possesses real assets: a clear identity, powerful symbols, a memory of development, high loyalty, and willingness to mobilise.

Those strengths can become limitations. If legitimacy is derived from historical suffering or family entitlement, acceptance of an opposing vote becomes difficult. Exclusionary slogans directed collectively at clerics, leftists, or the Mojahedin convert individual responsibility into identity-based guilt. Displays of loyalty can replace evaluation of programmes, competence, and accountability. Hostility toward a West believed to have abandoned the Shah can also conflict with the need to win support from Western democracies.

Affective polarisation arises when members of the opposing camp are seen not simply as mistaken but as morally contaminated and existentially threatening. Research suggests that such polarisation reduces trust, cooperation, and acceptance of shared rules (Iyengar et al., 2019). In a multi-ethnic and ideologically diverse Iran, transition without coalition is impossible.

Another danger is dependence on an external 'moment of rescue'. Military attack may weaken a government, but no bombing campaign can build legitimacy, a constitution, an independent judiciary, or trust among political groups. The task of leadership is not to suppress the understandable anger of victims and exiles but to transform it into lawful justice. Victims have a right to truth, trial, and reparation; no democratic movement should recognise a right to arbitrary revenge or collective punishment.

6.2 The Pragmatic, Human-Rights-Centred Tendency

The pragmatic approach begins by asking which framework can bring the largest possible range of Iranians and the greatest legitimate international support around an orderly transition. From this perspective, Reza Pahlavi is politically significant not because monarchy must be restored in advance, but because his name and network can provide a vehicle for secular democracy, national cohesion, and dialogue with the world.

Human rights are central: opposition to execution, torture, political imprisonment, shooting protesters, and criminalising opinion; support for people blinded or disabled, bereaved families, and prisoners; and insistence on equality for women, ethnic groups, religions, political tendencies, and ways of life. Human rights are not merely an instrument for delegitimising the Islamic Republic; they are the moral map of the replacement order.

This strategy has an advantage in coalition-building because it separates individuals from group labels. Democratic leftists, republicans, constitutional monarchists, secular believers, Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, Azeris, Baha’is, Sunnis, Christians, Jews, and non-believers should all be able to participate without denying their identities. Parliament is not where disagreement disappears; it is where disagreement becomes lawful competition.

Chenoweth and Stephan show that broad civil resistance can, in many cases, have a greater probability of success and more durable democratic outcomes because it lowers participation thresholds, attracts diverse groups, and can induce defections from pillars of power (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). This is not a mechanical formula for Iran, but it underlines the importance of strikes, civil disobedience, professional organisation, secure communications, and targeted appeals to state personnel not to participate in repression.

The human-rights-centred approach also requires criticism. It can remain at the level of moral declarations while lacking crisis command, financing, networks inside Iran, or plans for continuity of services. It can spend excessive energy meeting Western politicians rather than building domestic power. It can also personalise leadership without clear mechanisms for decision-making, appointment, auditing, and dispute resolution. Constructive criticism is therefore not betrayal; it is a method of increasing governing capacity.

7. Reza Pahlavi: The Possibility of National Leadership, Not Ownership of Sovereignty

In his 6 July 2026 address to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Dutch House of Representatives, Reza Pahlavi articulated four principles for transition: Iran’s territorial integrity; equal rights and individual freedoms for all citizens; separation of religion and state; and the people’s right to choose the future form of government. He stressed that the objective was not to predetermine a republic or constitutional monarchy, but to reach free and fair elections (Pahlavi, 2026b). These principles can form the core of an inclusive political contract.

His official programmes have also referred to plans for the first hundred days, continuity of essential services, a constitutional process under international observation, committing Iran to a peaceful and verifiable nuclear policy, ending support for terrorist groups, normalising relations with the United States, recognising Israel, an open economy, and extending the Abraham Accords into a proposed 'Cyrus Accord' (Pahlavi, 2025; 2026a; 2026d). These are significant directions, but they should be converted into measurable implementation documents with responsible officials, costs, timetables, and success criteria.

Reuters reported in July 2026 both Pahlavi’s prominence and significant support, as well as criticism concerning organisation, coalition-building, some hard-line supporters, and his team. In the same interview he explicitly condemned violence by extremist supporters and described himself not as the destination but as a bridge to the destination (Reuters, 2026). That metaphor is credible only if the bridge does not own the destination and permits all democratic currents to cross.

GAMAAN’s report published in July 2026, based on its June survey, distinguished respondents whose view of Reza Pahlavi remained positive (45.2%) from those whose view remained negative (28.3%). These are categories of stability, not the total favourable and unfavourable shares: a further 3.2% reported a change to a positive view and 7.1% a change to a negative view. The figures therefore imply approximately 48.4% positive and 35.4% negative responses within the report’s weighted estimates. Online recruitment, weighting assumptions and the difficulty of reaching citizens safely under authoritarian conditions limit the inference that can be drawn. Such evidence can inform political discussion, but it is neither a national consensus nor an electoral mandate (GAMAAN, 2026).

A more defensible role is therefore that of temporary trustee of national sovereignty or coordinator of transition: aligning networks, defending citizens’ rights, facilitating defections from repression, negotiating with the world, and then transferring authority according to a clear timetable to institutions derived from the vote. The title 'leader of national reconciliation' should be earned through inclusive conduct, acceptance of criticism, and defence of opponents’ rights.

At least six safeguards are needed: a written public charter; defined duration and limits of authority; a plural transitional council; independent financial audit; published criteria for selecting officials; and a commitment to elections, a constituent assembly or comparable mechanism, and referendum. Conflict-of-interest rules should also clarify whether and how members of the transitional authority may stand in the first elections.

The March 2026 establishment of a committee to draft transitional-justice regulations is consistent with the need to legalise accountability, but its credibility depends on a published framework, victim participation, expert independence, fair-trial guarantees, and differentiation among commanders, direct perpetrators, and non-offending employees (Pahlavi, 2026c; United Nations, 2023).

8. A Message to the World: A Free Iran as a Partner in Security and Development

International support cannot be won merely by saying that the Islamic Republic is bad. A democratic transition must show its legitimate benefits for Iranians and for the wider world. A law-governed Iran could end support for proxy and terrorist groups, resolve the nuclear dispute through transparent and verifiable arrangements, reduce missile threats, strengthen security of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and establish normal relations with neighbours, the United States, and Israel. These are not concessions to foreigners; they would redirect national resources toward Iranian welfare.

Reza Pahlavi’s proposed 'Cyrus Accord' describes an extension of the logic of the Abraham Accords to Iran and a regional framework based on recognition, trade, and cooperation (Pahlavi, 2025). Analytically, this remains a political proposal rather than a concluded treaty or guarantee of peace. Its value lies in changing strategic direction from export of revolution toward regional cooperation.

A strong Iran need not mean an Iran armed with nuclear weapons or long-range missiles. Durable strength can arise from an educated population, energy, geography, markets, technology, transit, industry, water management, and environmental governance. A democratic state is strong when it can tax and answer to citizens, enforce contracts, restrain corruption, and retain human capital.

A successful Iranian economy could expand work and trade in the region and reduce some drivers of migration such as unemployment, insecurity, and service collapse. Migration is multi-causal, however, and regime change alone cannot be promised to end migration flows. Credible diplomacy distinguishes capacity and probability from guarantees.

Cooperation with the world should be complementary: sovereignty comes from the Iranian people; external support can provide space, technology, pressure, and guarantees, but cannot replace domestic will and organisation. Democratic governments can legitimately be asked to support communications, human-rights defenders, targeted sanctions, accountability, and reconstruction—not to choose Iran’s ruler from abroad.

9. Imperatives and Prohibitions for Democratic Power-Building

Every campaign action should be tested by two questions: does it increase the capacity for transition, and does it simultaneously increase the probability of democracy after transition? An action that strengthens only internal group cohesion while destroying a national coalition is strategically incomplete. An action that wins foreign support while burning domestic legitimacy is not success.

Political opinion should not itself be criminalised. Being communist, Islamist, republican, monarchist, or a former member of an institution is not in itself a crime. Crimes are specific acts—murder, torture, corruption, hostage-taking, terrorism, or knowing participation in repression—and must be proven in an independent court with rights of defence. Blanket amnesty is also dangerous. Transitional justice must balance truth, prosecution of grave crimes, reparations, institutional reform, and guarantees of non-recurrence (Teitel, 2000; Hayner, 2011; United Nations, 2023).

10. A Four-Stage Roadmap for Transition

Stage One: Before the Final Rupture

Common charter: territorial integrity, equal citizenship, separation of religion and state, prohibition of execution and torture, free elections, and the people’s right to determine the form of government.

Domestic organisation: strengthen professional, student, women’s, neighbourhood, and expert networks; train non-violent action; build secure communications and decentralised decision-making.

Human-rights documentation: preserve evidential chains, victims’ names, places and dates, and coordinate with international bodies for future accountability.

Targeted defections: call on military, police, and administrative personnel not to participate in repression, while guaranteeing individual due process and distinguishing public service from participation in crimes.

Responsible diplomacy: seek specific support for internet access, activist safety, targeted sanctions, international justice, and emergency assistance while opposing infrastructure destruction and civilian harm.

Stage Two: From the Fall of the Regime to the First Hundred Days

Protection and continuity: secure hospitals, water, electricity, banks, telecommunications, airports, ports, food depots, nuclear facilities, and state archives; prevent looting and revenge.

Immediate legal measures: free political prisoners; halt executions; prohibit torture; repeal compulsory hijab and laws criminalising opinion; establish the jurisdiction of independent interim courts.

Limited transitional government: publish its composition, powers, duration, budget, and minutes; prohibit parallel partisan armed forces and place weapons under temporary lawful command.

Security and individual vetting: suspend and investigate officials suspected of grave crimes without blindly dissolving institutions; retain professional staff and provide rights of appeal.

Economic and social stability: emergency budget, operational central-bank independence, payment of salaries, support for vulnerable groups, reopening of trade, and transparent publication of contracts and debts.

Stage Three: Constitution-Making and Elections

Constituent assembly or constitutional convention elected with meaningful participation by women, regions, ethnic groups, religions, and political currents, with public access to drafts.

Free debate and equal access: independent media, public debates, civic education about republican and constitutional-monarchical options, and equal opportunity for peaceful campaigning.

Referendum and elections: domestic and international observation, transparent voter registration, an independent electoral commission, judicial appeal, and prior commitment by all sides to accept lawful results.

Entrenched rights charter: freedom of expression, religion and non-belief, association, gender equality, prohibition of ethnic discrimination, fair trial, property, and privacy even against temporary majorities.

Stage Four: Democratic Consolidation

Civilian control of the armed forces: transparent budgets, accountable command, prohibition of military party/economic activity, and parliamentary oversight.

Judicial and media independence: independent judicial governance, security of tenure for judges, accountable prosecution, freedom of information, and prevention of state or dynastic media monopoly.

Long-term transitional justice: truth commission, fair prosecution of grave crimes, reparations, reform of policing and education, and public memorialisation.

Decentralisation and social contract: stronger local councils, fair distribution of resources, linguistic and cultural rights, predictable taxation, and a social safety net.

Rotation of power: periodic elections, term limits where appropriate, transparent party finance, anti-corruption institutions, and genuine acceptance that popular leaders can lose elections.

11. Standards for Constructive Criticism within the Lion and Sun Movement

Constructive criticism should be specific, evidence-based, proportionate, and accompanied by a proposed solution. The critic should identify which decision is problematic, according to what standard, with what consequence, and what alternative is proposed. Leaders should distinguish criticism and political competition from genuine security threats.

Five questions can become a public standard: How was the decision made? Who is accountable? Where does the money come from? Which stakeholders were heard? How will the result be measured and corrected? Regular publication of answers builds more trust than propaganda.

Supporters of Reza Pahlavi should avoid two extremes: turning him into an infallible figure whose every critic is a conspirator, and expecting one person without domestic networks, institutions, and collective cooperation to solve every problem. Effective leadership is reciprocal: the leader provides direction and coordination; society provides organisation and oversight.

The boundary between political competition and protection of a democratic front must remain clear. Republicans and constitutional monarchists can compete over the form of government while remaining united on freeing prisoners, separation of religion and state, territorial integrity, prohibition of torture, and free elections. Coalition does not erase differences; it postpones unnecessary conflict until a healthy arena of competition exists.

Conclusion: Process above Person, Rights above Revenge

Iran needs more than a change of faces; it needs a change in the logic of power. The Islamic Republic has linked power to religious ideology, appointed institutions, violence, and impunity. The democratic answer cannot be an inverted version of the same logic with a different ideology, leader, and set of collective enemies. Successful transition occurs when power is transformed from privilege into public trust.

The Lion and Sun movement can be a major force in such a transition because it possesses a national symbol, a memory of state-building, and energetic networks. To become genuinely national, however, it must show that the Lion and Sun is not a mark of exclusion but a canopy of equality—not a licence for unconditional restoration, but a sign of Iran’s return to law, dignity, and the world.

Reza Pahlavi can credibly become a leader of national cohesion and reconciliation not because of inherited right, but through coalition-building, consistent defence of human rights, institutional preparedness, transparency, and commitment to transfer power. The more precise and measurable these commitments become, the more durable domestic support can be and the clearer the reason for democratic governments to cooperate.

The strength of a future Iran should arise from its economy, knowledge, law, trust, and peace. Security in the Strait of Hormuz, an end to nuclear and proxy adventurism, normal relations with neighbours and Israel, and cooperation with Europe and North America can be consequences of a national and accountable state; but the first measure of success must remain the freedom and dignity of Iranians themselves.

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Temporal note: This English edition is based on information available up to 9 August 2026. Because events are developing rapidly and access to Iran is restricted, some data concerning war, casualties, and political alignments may require future revision.