ایران و اسرائیل؛ فراتر از دشمن مشترک — نسخهٔ انگلیسی

Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, MD, PhD, MBA
25 September 2026 · English edition revised 13 October 2026

From the memory of Cyrus and Iranian–Jewish coexistence to secular democracy, development and the proposed Cyrus Accord.

Abstract

Is the rapprochement between Israel and Iranians seeking a transition away from the Islamic Republic merely the result of shared hostility towards the same government? This article argues that, although such an explanation illuminates part of their convergence on security, it is insufficient to understand the potential of a future relationship. The deeper foundations of that relationship should be sought in the historical memory associated with Cyrus, the long-standing Jewish presence in Iranian society, the experience of cooperation during the Pahlavi era, the imperative to defend freedom of conscience, and the possibility of connecting complementary economies. Within this framework, friendship with Israel need not mean relinquishing Iran’s independence; it can instead form part of a redefinition of national interests based on peace, development and equal citizenship. The article also emphasises the need to reassess Western policies towards authoritarian Islamism and to turn support for the rights of Iranians into a lasting commitment. The ‘Cyrus Accord’, as discussed here, is a proposed vision for extending the logic of coexistence embodied in the Abraham Accords: a partnership between a free Iran, Israel and the United States, open to neighbouring countries and other communities in the region. Realising this vision requires the will of the Iranian people, accountable institutions and practical programmes of cooperation. History provides a foundation from which to begin this journey, not a substitute for building it.

Keywords: Iran and Israel; Cyrus the Great; Iranian Jews; secular democracy; foreign policy; Abraham Accords; Cyrus Accord

Method and scope

This article is a narrative review and historical–policy analysis, rather than an empirical study or systematic review. It draws on specialist scholarship, museum documentation, official texts and institutional reports. Religious narratives, historical evidence and policy proposals have different evidential roles. My position supports a transition to secular democracy and peaceful relations between Iran and Israel; it does not presume consensus among Iranians, Israelis or Jews. The original source review was dated 25 September 2026. Key institutional claims and links were checked for this publication revision on 13 October 2026.

1. The central question: friendship to confront, or cooperation to build?

‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend’ is a rule for explaining temporary alignments, not a sufficient foundation for a lasting relationship. If friendship rests entirely on the presence of a common enemy, the rationale for the relationship weakens when that enemy disappears. The serious question concerning Iran and Israel is therefore not whether opposition to the Islamic Republic can bring them closer together. The more important question is what, after the end of this government, would encourage the two societies to continue cooperating. The answer proposed in this article is clear: shared memory, mutual respect, freedom and the benefits of development.

For Iranians who see their country’s future in secular democracy, foreign policy should be an extension of the people’s right to choose. They should not be denied the right to befriend another country’s people simply because their government has drawn political dividing lines against that country. Iran does not belong to an ideological apparatus, and its foreign relations should not remain hostage to permanent enmities. From this perspective, normalising relations with Israel is part of a larger project: restoring to citizens and their elected institutions the authority to define friends, partners and the national interest.

We must distinguish between three levels: relations between Iranians and Jews, relations between Iranian and Israeli citizens, and relations between the two states. These levels are not identical, but they can reinforce one another. The presence of Iranian Jews itself demonstrates that ‘Iranian’ and ‘Jewish’ are not mutually opposed identities. The account of this community in Encyclopaedia Iranica describes a long-standing connection within Iran’s cultural and social life. The relationship under discussion is therefore not simply an encounter between two states in a particular security context; part of it connects branches of a shared lived experience. [1]

2. Cyrus: historical memory with political potential today

Cyrus the Great conquered Babylon in 539 BCE. In the account in the Book of Ezra, his decree allows Jewish exiles to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple. The Cyrus Cylinder, using the language and political traditions of Babylon, also speaks of restoring images of the gods, returning groups of displaced people and reviving sanctuaries. For historical precision, the specific reference to the return of the Jews comes from Ezra; the cylinder itself does not mention Jews by name. The significance of this body of evidence lies in opening a path to rebuilding the religious and social life of conquered populations. [2, 3]

The modern concept of equal citizenship cannot be applied directly to an ancient imperial system. Nevertheless, the experience of Cyrus can inspire political thought today. In this reading, power need not be used to impose uniformity of belief or to humiliate others; it can make life and reconstruction possible. This provides a bridge between historical heritage and a contemporary programme: fidelity to the name of Cyrus becomes meaningful when freedom of conscience, the security of minorities and respect for differences are translated into institutions and law.

The political value of this memory does not lie in constructing a myth of uninterrupted friendship, but in providing a shared language for a new beginning. In foreign policy, a shared narrative can reduce the psychological barriers to rapprochement. When the other side is no longer known solely through the image of an enemy, dialogue begins from a more favourable position. In this sense, ‘Cyrus’ names a form of symbolic capital: a reminder that Iran can be associated with liberation and reconstruction in another people’s memory, and can revive that potential in its future policies.

The Abrahamic narrative can also provide another language of coexistence. In Genesis, Abraham’s family sets out from ‘Ur of the Chaldeans’ towards Canaan and settles in Harran. Within the same tradition, Ishmael and Isaac are sons of Abraham, and Jacob is Isaac’s son. This religious narrative should be understood in that capacity, not as evidence of an Iranian origin for Abraham or as a genetic genealogy of present-day nations. Its constructive potential for this discussion lies in its invitation to ethical kinship and dialogue. [4]

3. Diaspora, persecution and the question of Jewish collective security

The history of the Jewish diaspora is not a single exodus from one point to one destination. Jewish communities have lived at different times in Iran, Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean world. Archaeological evidence assembled by the Metropolitan Museum of Art indicates the widespread presence of synagogues in cities of the Roman Empire. The destruction of the Second Temple by Roman forces in 70 CE was a foundational event in Jewish memory, but this dispersed, multi-centred history cannot be reduced to that event alone. The continuity of the Jewish community in Iran is another important strand of the same history. [5, 1]

In medieval Europe, the Jewish minority was repeatedly subjected to accusations and violence. In his study of the Black Death, Samuel Cohn examines the persecutions of 1348–1351, when unfounded allegations such as the poisoning of water and food led to the torture and killing of Jews. In later periods, pogroms—violent attacks on Jewish communities—also threatened their security, particularly in the Russian Empire and Eastern Europe. These examples show how a general crisis can be transformed into the persecution of a minority by creating a scapegoat defined by identity. [6, 7]

The question of finding a secure territory was reflected even in Soviet nationalities policy. A specific example is the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in the Soviet Far East, formally established in 1934 under Stalin. This project should be understood as an experiment within the Soviet state, not the creation of an independent country or an initiative implemented under Lenin. The very existence of such a proposal shows that questions of Jewish security, settlement and self-organisation were not confined to a single political movement or geographical area. [8]

The Holocaust was a horrific point in this history: Nazi Germany and its allies and collaborators murdered six million European Jews. After the war, many survivors remained in displaced persons camps; some wished to go to Palestine, while others sought entry to the United States. Migration to North America should be understood within the context of modern migration, not as a direct and immediate continuation of the wars of ancient Rome. For these people, the central issue was the possibility of living without the recurring threat of exclusion and annihilation. [9]

The political movement of Zionism had emerged before the Second World War, in the late nineteenth century. The Holocaust gave added urgency to the question of Jewish security and refuge, but the emergence of Israel resulted from a combination of earlier developments and political decisions. On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution 181, proposed partitioning the territory under the British Mandate into Jewish and Arab states; Israel declared independence on 14 May 1948. This history illuminates both the importance of the Jewish right to security and the necessity of a peace that also encompasses the security and rights of neighbouring peoples, including Palestinians. [10, 11]

4. Iranian Jews and the legacy of cooperation during the Pahlavi era

We need not look only to ancient royal courts to find connections between Iran and Jews. Iranian Jews have contributed to the country’s language, music, culture and urban life. With his bilingual dictionaries, Soleiman Haim is a well-known example of a contribution whose benefits belong to all Persian speakers. Such an experience breaks down the simplistic boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’: Iranian Jews are part of ‘us’. This very overlap of identities is among the strongest grounds for the possibility of friendship with Israeli society and Jewish communities in other countries. [1]

Under Reza Shah, state reforms and the easing of some legal restrictions expanded Jewish access to schools, public employment and life beyond traditional neighbourhoods. During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, the community’s educational, professional and economic opportunities increased further. Orly Rahimiyan’s study in Encyclopaedia Iranica identifies this period, particularly the later Pahlavi decades, as significant for social mobility and the flourishing of Jewish institutions. The value of this experience lies in demonstrating the capacity of national development to enable minority participation. Its achievements could be complemented in the future by durable democratic and legal guarantees. [12]

In 1950, Iran recognised Israel de facto—that is, in practice rather than through full legal recognition. In subsequent decades, cooperation expanded in trade, oil, agriculture, technical affairs and security, and direct flights were established. Geopolitical motives influenced this relationship, but did not explain it entirely: exchanges of goods and expertise, together with travel, also generated tangible benefits and mutual familiarity. This precedent suggests that future cooperation need not be exclusively security-based or concealed. It can be open, governed by law and grounded in public consent. [10]

The 1979 revolution interrupted this trajectory of state relations. The execution of Habib Elghanian on 9 May 1979 contributed to heightened anxiety and emigration among Iranian Jews. Israel was not the only destination; the United States, particularly California and New York, also played an important role. The human consequences of these migrations can be turned into an opportunity for the future: families and professionals familiar with Iranian culture can help build trust, share experience and restore cultural connections. Respect for their identities and choices must take precedence over any political expectations placed on this community. [1]

5. Secular democracy: the ethical foundation of a new relationship

Iran’s desired future must begin with a clear principle: no citizen should be assigned an inferior status because of belief or non-belief. Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Baha’is, Buddhists and people with no religion should be able to live in the same country, hold employment and public office, and decide their political destiny. In this sense, secular democracy is not an enemy of religion; it prevents a particular religious interpretation from becoming the standard by which citizens are privileged or disadvantaged. Freedom of conscience is complete only when it encompasses both the freedom to hold a religion and the freedom to change religion or have none.

The distinction between this model and the structure of the Islamic Republic is institutional. Article 12 of the constitution declares Islam and the Twelver Ja‘fari school to be official and unalterable; Article 13 names only Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians as recognised religious minorities. Recognition of these three communities is not the same as state neutrality towards all beliefs. This article proposes a transition from ‘conditional toleration of groups’ to ‘unconditional equality of citizens in fundamental rights’—a principle that should guide both domestic policy and relations with other nations. [13]

Israel’s democratic institutions provide one basis for dialogue, while their weaknesses require scrutiny. Freedom House’s 2026 report classifies Israel as “Free”, at 73 out of 100, and describes a multiparty parliamentary democracy. It also identifies pressure on judicial independence and persistent disparities affecting minorities. The score excludes conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, which are assessed separately; it must not be used to imply that all people under Israeli authority enjoy the same rights. For a future Iran, the relevant lesson is the importance of political competition, institutional checks and continuous reform. Friendship permits criticism of government conduct and cannot require silence about the rights of Palestinians or any other population. [14]

For me, as a trauma surgeon, the value of a political relationship must ultimately be judged by its impact on human lives. This is an ethical measure: a policy worthy of defence is one that leaves fewer people injured, fewer families bereaved and fewer children without a future. Iranian and Israeli security should not be defined in opposition to one another. The same reasoning that demands the right to a secure life for these two societies must also recognise it for Arabs, Kurds and Palestinians. The desired accord is an alliance for life, not for the extension of enmity.

6. Complementary interests: from natural resources to the knowledge economy

Lasting friendship requires a practical economic programme. The United Nations Population Fund estimates Iran’s population in 2025 at 92.4 million. The World Bank also emphasises its large domestic market, educated workforce and the role of oil and gas in the Iranian economy. On the other side, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 2025 economic survey identifies Israel’s high-technology sector and artificial intelligence potential as important sources of its economic strength. Taken together, these characteristics suggest the possibility of complementarity; they do not, by themselves, guarantee successful cooperation. [15, 16, 17]

What can bring Iranians and Israelis together in science and business is the opportunity for talented people to collaborate. Education, skills, freedom of research, access to capital and regulatory stability are matters that can be addressed through planning. Discussion of shared potential is better grounded in these institutional factors: a university able to conduct research; an entrepreneur working under transparent regulations; and a professional who is not excluded because of identity or belief. This language is both more precise and more open to the participation of all groups in society.

Water and agriculture could be among the first areas of cooperation. The announcement of Prince Reza Pahlavi’s April 2023 visit to Israel listed the exploration of cooperation in water technology and meetings with agricultural specialists among the visit’s objectives. In a future programme, this direction could lead to joint projects on water recycling, reducing losses, monitoring consumption and farming adapted to water scarcity. Such projects should be implemented with climate studies, independent evaluation and the involvement of Iranian specialists. The aim is the considered transfer of knowledge, not the assumption that a ready-made solution exists for all of Iran’s problems. [18]

Health and medicine also offer a humanitarian basis for building trust. A practical proposal is to establish educational and research networks in trauma care, rehabilitation, mass-casualty incident management and diagnostic technologies. Scholarships, faculty exchanges and joint courses can make the relationship tangible even before large economic projects take shape. Professional independence, patient consent, data confidentiality and equitable access must be fundamental to the design of these networks. Health diplomacy gains credibility when its benefits reach patients, rather than becoming merely a publicity exercise.

In a broader perspective, relations with the United States could, within a negotiated framework, facilitate access to capital, markets and academic cooperation. Yet Iran should not be merely a supplier of raw materials within the proposed triangle. The national interest lies in increasing value added, developing domestic companies and achieving genuine knowledge transfer. Transparent contracts, fair competition, measures against corruption and public scrutiny should be part of the cooperation from the outset. A strong Iran within this partnership is not a dependent and submissive Iran, but a country capable of negotiating and choosing independently.

7. From the lessons of the Cold War to the need to reassess European policy

Criticism of Western strategy towards Islamism becomes more robust when it focuses on specific decisions and institutional consequences. In his memorandum to Jimmy Carter of 26 December 1979, responding to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed increased financial and military support for the resistance and cooperation with Islamic countries. This document clearly illustrates the weight of anti-Soviet reasoning in policymaking at the time. Such evidence allows the instrumental use of religious forces to be examined without reducing every regional development to a single plan or every Western government to a single will. [19]

The lesson drawn by this article is that the long-term costs of strengthening religious authoritarianism must not be overshadowed by short-term geopolitical advantage. If secular forces, independent citizens and civil institutions are noticed only when they fit the security calculations of the day, support for democracy becomes an inconsistent slogan. This criticism is not directed at a religion or its believers. It is directed at policies that treat individual rights as expendable when weighed against the benefits of dealing with those in power.

The killing of protesters on 8 and 9 January 2026, corresponding to 18 and 19 Dey 1404 in the Iranian calendar, highlighted the need for this reassessment. In its report of 8 July 2026, Amnesty International described the killing of thousands of protesters and bystanders over those two days and the continuing crisis of impunity. The organisation also warned that efforts to reach political agreements must not sideline demands for justice for the victims. Within this framework, attributing Iranians’ aspirations for freedom to the manoeuvring of foreign powers is not a justified response to their right to protest and to live. [20]

An assessment of Europe must also acknowledge concrete actions: on 19 February 2026, following the political agreement of 29 January, the Council of the European Union formally placed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on its terrorist list. The strategic question now is how such measures can be connected to a sustained policy of supporting people’s rights. Success is not measured merely by declarations of condemnation. Pursuing accountability, supporting civil society, preserving free access to information and protecting threatened dissidents must also be central to policy. [21]

Europe can be a partner in this future rather than a spectator. The reassessment sought here does not mean confronting Muslims or restricting religious freedom. It means drawing a clear distinction between the right to practise a religion and the project of imposing religious power. A secular Iranian, a woman seeking equality, a Baha’i citizen, a critical Muslim and a person with no religion should all receive equal legal protection. Democratic foreign policy is coherent when it does not measure these individuals’ rights by their proximity to, or distance from, the United States, Israel, Russia or any other power.

8. From the Abraham Accords to the vision of the Cyrus Accord

The Abraham Accords Declaration of 2020 emphasises coexistence, human dignity, religious freedom, intercultural dialogue and cooperation in science, the arts, medicine and commerce. The significance of this language lies in taking relations with Israel out of a framework of inevitable enmity and into the realm of political choice and shared interests. The lesson that can be extended to Iran is the same: historical disagreements must not become an eternal obligation to continue hostility. Peace can be translated into a set of relationships that can be built. [22]

In his speech of 26 May 2025, entitled ‘A Path to the Cyrus Accord’, Prince Reza Pahlavi described the bond between Iranians and Jews as extending beyond episodic diplomacy, connecting it to a vision of cooperation among free nations. In this article, the ‘Cyrus Accord’ names this proposed horizon for relations between a post-Islamic Republic Iran, Israel and the region; it is not the name of a treaty currently concluded between the governments of Iran and Israel. Distinguishing between a proposal and an existing reality gives the idea a basis for implementation: the vision must be translated into commitments, institutions and clearly defined stages. [23]

From this article’s perspective, extending the logic of the Abraham Accords into the Cyrus Accord means adding a free Iran to the architecture of regional peace, not replacing one axis of hostility with another. Iran, Israel and the United States could form the core of a framework for cooperation, but that framework must remain open to Arab countries and other neighbours. Kurds, Arabs, Iranians, Jews and other peoples of the region, with their diverse and sometimes overlapping identities, should benefit from reduced tensions. A broader peace is compatible with safeguarding Palestinian rights and security, and is strengthened by improvements in both.

Such an arrangement must be founded on national sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the political choices of peoples and the peaceful resolution of disputes. No country should have to surrender control of its foreign policy in order to befriend another. For the same reason, the proposed relationship with the United States and Israel must not lead to compulsory hostility towards Europe or other countries. The standard is a freely chosen partnership whose outcomes can be assessed, turning security from a destructive competition into a foundation for public well-being.

9. From historical opportunity to a practical programme

A historic opening does not yield results through hope and slogans alone; it must be translated into political and institutional capacity. The first stage is to build trust among Iranians committed to freedom and to formulate an explicit commitment to the people’s vote and the equality of citizens. International support is constructive when it strengthens this Iranian agency rather than replacing it. No foreign partner can confer legitimacy on a future political order in place of the Iranian people.

The next stage is to develop an open and accountable path towards normalisation. A government with democratic legitimacy can pursue mutual recognition, consular relations, easier family visits, and academic and economic cooperation within the law. Public review of agreements, parliamentary oversight and expert participation must prevent the new relationship from being reduced to a secret arrangement among a small circle of power holders. A friendship that people cannot question will lack a strong social foundation.

To make the promise of peace measurable, initial projects can begin with limited objectives: a joint health education programme, a pilot water-management project, a researcher-exchange network and a mechanism to facilitate contact between families. The number of sustained collaborations, the extent of skills transfer, equitable access and visible benefits for citizens are better measures than the number of ceremonies and declarations. Public trust is built through successful experiences of cooperation, not by repeatedly asserting that it already exists.

The meaning of a ‘strong Iran’ must also be clear along this path. Strength is not merely the accumulation of military equipment; it is the capacity to retain talent, provide water and energy, protect citizens’ lives and create hope for the future. A secure and advanced Israel can likewise benefit from a less tense regional neighbourhood. The purpose of cooperation is to enhance people’s capacity to live well. When students, doctors, farmers and entrepreneurs see the benefits of the relationship in their daily lives, peace ceases to be merely an elite decision and becomes a social asset.

10. Conclusion: a friendship that remains meaningful beyond enmity

The desired relationship between Iran and Israel must not be reduced to shared hostility towards the Islamic Republic. The legacy of Cyrus, the lives of Iranian Jews, the history of cooperation between the two countries and the possibility of connecting human and economic capacities provide the building blocks for a deeper relationship. These precedents do not automatically guarantee friendship, but they show that building it need not begin from nothing. Enmity may provide a motive for rapprochement; what sustains the relationship is mutual benefit and respect for freedom.

For me, support for friendship between Iran and Israel is part of defending an Iran in which no one is a stranger in their own homeland because of religion, ancestry or non-belief. The Cyrus Accord will deserve its name when it transforms the memory of liberation into security today, and the language of coexistence into the institutions of tomorrow. This vision brings together a free and strong Iran, a secure Israel, constructive relations with the United States, and responsible participation by Europe and neighbouring countries. The destination is not merely the end of an enmity. It is the creation of a region whose people can plan for better lives instead of preparing for the next crisis.

References

References are numbered in order of first citation. The original source-review date was 25 September 2026; this web edition preserves the original source links and the distinction between historical scholarship, religious texts, institutional findings and political proposals.

[1] History and social presence of Iranian Jews

Sarshar, H. (2009; updated 2018). Judeo-Persian Communities i. Introduction. Encyclopaedia Iranica, XV(1), 89–90.

[2] Cyrus, Babylon and the Cyrus Cylinder

J. Paul Getty Museum (2013). The Cyrus Cylinder and Ancient Persia: A New Beginning. Getty Villa exhibition resource.

[3] Ezra 1:1–4: the religious narrative of the decree permitting return

The Holy Bible (NIV, 2011). Ezra 1:1–4. Biblica; text hosted by Bible Gateway. Religious primary text.

[4] Genesis: the narrative of Abraham, Isaac, Ishmael and Jacob

The Holy Bible (NIV, 2011). Genesis 11:27–32; 25:9, 19–26. Biblica; text hosted by Bible Gateway. Religious primary text. Additional passage: Genesis 25.

[5] Jewish communities in the Roman and Byzantine periods

Boehm, B. D., & Holcomb, M. (2008). Jewish Art in Late Antiquity and Early Byzantium. Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History. The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

[6] The Black Death and the persecution of Jews; publisher extract consulted

Cohn, S. K., Jr. (2007). The Black Death and the Burning of Jews. Past & Present, 196(1), 3–36. DOI: 10.1093/pastj/gtm005. Publisher extract consulted.

[7] Definition and history of pogroms

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (n.d.). Pogroms. Holocaust Encyclopedia.

[8] Birobidzhan; research abstract consulted through the Institute for Jewish Policy Research archive

Vitale, A. (2021). The Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in Siberia. European Spatial Research and Policy, 28(1), 161–184. DOI: 10.18778/1231-1952.28.1.08. Abstract consulted via JPR archive.

[9] The Holocaust and the circumstances of displaced survivors

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (n.d.). Introduction to the Holocaust. Holocaust Encyclopedia.

[10] History of relations between Iran and Israel

Menashri, D., & Parsi, T. (2007; updated 2016). Israel i. Relations with Iran. Encyclopaedia Iranica, XIV(2), 213–223.

[11] The partition resolution and the establishment of Israel

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (n.d.). Creation of Israel, 1948. Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations.

[12] The position of Iranian Jews during the Pahlavi era

Rahimiyan, O. R. (2009; updated 2018). Judeo-Persian Communities vi. The Pahlavi Era (1925–1979). Encyclopaedia Iranica, XV(2), 124–132.

[13] Articles 12 and 13 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic

Islamic Republic of Iran (1979; revised 1989). Constitution, Articles 12–13. English text reproduced by the Constitute Project.

[14] Assessment of political rights and civil liberties in Israel

Freedom House (2026). Israel: Freedom in the World 2026. Country report; West Bank and Gaza are assessed separately.

[15] Iran’s estimated population in 2025

United Nations Population Fund (2025). Iran, Islamic Republic of Population 2025. World Population Dashboard. Total population: 92,400,000.

[16] Iran’s economic structure, resources and human-capital potential

World Bank (n.d.). Islamic Republic of Iran: Overview. Country overview; continuously updated webpage.

[17] Israel’s economic survey and high-technology potential

OECD (2025). OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2025. OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: 10.1787/d6dd02bc-en.

[18] Visit announcement and the objectives of scientific and environmental cooperation

Pahlavi, R. (2023, April 16). Historic Visit to Israel. Official website; announcement of the visit and its objectives.

[19] Official document on US policy towards Afghanistan and the Soviet intervention

Brzezinski, Z. (1979, December 26). Memorandum to President Carter: Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 97. Office of the Historian.

[20] The killings of 8 and 9 January 2026 and the demand for accountability

Amnesty International (2026, July 8). Iran: Lack of international justice six months after January protest massacres risks further atrocity crimes. Research-based public statement on the January 2026 protest killings and accountability.

[21] The European Union’s official decision concerning the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Council of the European Union (2026, February 19). EU terrorist list: Council designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation. Official press release.

[22] The original text of the Abraham Accords Declaration

United States, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain (2020, September 15). The Abraham Accords Declaration. Signed declaration. Archived White House document.

[23] Transcript of Prince Reza Pahlavi’s speech on the vision of the Cyrus Accord

Pahlavi, R. (2025, May 26). A Path to the Cyrus Accord. Speech transcript, official website. Primary source for the proposed vision.