

ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Organizational Skills within the **Lion and Sun Movement**

Civic cooperation, resilience and the people's free choice



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COMPLETE ENGLISH EDITION | 23 OCTOBER 2026

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The argument of the book

A movement needs people who can work together before it can build institutions that serve a nation. The book moves from the human purpose of organization and the value of small groups to coordinated professional work, a clear mission and democratic accountability.

Chapters Three and Four complete the author's dictated manuscript. The earlier opening chapters and Chapter Two are included in full after their original instalment cover. The combined edition provides a new cover, a contents page, navigation bookmarks and continuous page numbers.

ABOUT THIS EDITION

Purpose, sources and democratic choice

This book is written by Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, MD, PhD, MBA, from his perspective as an Iranian civic activist, constitutional monarchist and supporter of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's transitional leadership. It brings professional and organizational experience into a discussion of Iran's secular democratic future.

Its proposals concern civic participation, professional preparation, humanitarian care and accountable institutions. The author argues that small groups and parallel initiatives can build capacities that later connect through wider structures. He also insists that the future constitutional settlement must be freely decided by the Iranian people.

Biographical recollections and political judgments are identified in the text. Numbered source notes accompany the opening chapters and each later chapter. References support specific factual passages and the management frameworks; they do not imply that their authors or institutions endorse this book.

The proposed umbrella sectors and practical objectives in Chapter Three are the author's recommendations. They are not formally announced departments of the Iran Prosperity Project. The book is an independent work, rather than an official publication of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi or the Project.

The official Emergency Phase Booklet is described according to the English download checked on 23 October 2026: a 180-day emergency period and an anticipated overall political process of 18-24 months, subject to the document's stated conditions. National milestones are proposals tied to a transition, rather than predictions of its date or guarantees of success.

SMART, PESTEL, SWOT and Lewin's force-field approach provide structured questions for discussion. The book's political applications are qualitative assessments. SWOT includes external opportunities and threats as well as internal strengths and weaknesses; force-field analysis can likewise consider forces within and outside a group.

Author: Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, MD, PhD, MBA

Complete English edition: 23 October 2026

Cover: commissioned Lion and Sun artwork

All page numbers in the contents refer to this combined edition.

AUTHOR AND BACKGROUND

Introduction

Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, MD, PhD, MBA, is a consultant trauma and orthopaedic surgeon whose political activity in support of secular democracy and the rule of law began in 1998. His interest in organization has developed through political participation, professional leadership and the practical demands of caring for people affected by violence.

He graduated from Shiraz Medical School in 1996. After completing military service as an accident and emergency doctor at Be'sat Hospital, the central hospital of the Iranian Air Force in Tehran, he left Iran for Germany in 1998. While seeking asylum, he pursued studies in politics, philosophy and economics at Humboldt University in Berlin. This period broadened his understanding of political ideas and the institutions through which people seek to change society.

During these years, he became familiar with Mansoor Hekmat, the founder and leader of the Worker-communist Party of Iran. He regarded Hekmat as an influential Marxist thinker and learned from his approach to organization, political debate and the mobilization of people around shared aims. Hekmat died of cancer on 4 July 2002.[1] In the fragmentation that followed, Mr Bakhshayesh continued his political engagement primarily as a commentator.

His political outlook subsequently developed towards support for the Lion and Sun movement and for Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as a leader of transition towards secular democracy. Central to this position is the right of Iranians to choose their future constitutional system through a free vote, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy. Support for transitional leadership must therefore remain compatible with popular sovereignty. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has publicly affirmed the principles of secular government, equality before the law and a democratic choice of the future system.[2]

Mr Bakhshayesh also completed an MBA to strengthen his understanding of management and organizational practice. His career in trauma and orthopaedic surgery has included managerial and clinical leadership responsibilities. These experiences inform his conviction that expertise and goodwill become effective when people have clear responsibilities and dependable ways to work together.

As a member of Patriotic Doctors of Iran, he supports humanitarian work for Iranians wounded or injured during the Lion and Sun uprising. He also seeks to prepare for further medical and rehabilitation needs as events unfold. For him, organization has a human purpose: connecting people and professional skills so that those in need receive practical help. This book brings that concern into a wider discussion of the movement's capacity to act together.

PURPOSE AND POLITICAL STANDPOINT

Preface

I have written this book because the Lion and Sun movement needs durable organization. People must meet, debate, accept responsibilities and sustain their work. Our objective is to end the Islamic Republic and establish secular democracy and the rule of law. That requires more than shared anger or a common symbol.

My judgment of the Islamic Republic is severe. I regard its political philosophy as destructive and apocalyptic: a system that places ideological survival above the lives, security and prosperity of the country. The barbarity of repression gives urgency to our task. Yet urgency alone does not create the institutions needed to protect people and prepare for a different future.

I support Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's transitional role and his stated commitment to enabling Iranians to decide their political future. Republicans and constitutional monarchists must be able to cooperate before competing over the constitutional settlement. Their common ground should be secular government, equal citizenship, civil liberties and the people's vote.[2,4]

There are serious obstacles. In my assessment, sections of the American left, some Democratic politicians and parts of the European political establishment place too much confidence in accommodation with the Islamic Republic. I believe calls for renewed negotiation overlook Iranians seeking fundamental change.

The killings of 8 and 9 January 2026 are central to my position. Amnesty International has described mass unlawful killings during those days and reported death tolls in the thousands during the uprising, while emphasizing obstacles to independent documentation.[3] For me, the dead and wounded make renewed negotiation with the same repressive apparatus an inadequate answer to Iran's political crisis.

My clinical involvement and work with Patriotic Doctors of Iran also bring a humanitarian responsibility. Injured people need treatment and rehabilitation; families need support. Assistance must follow medical need and human dignity, without depending on political allegiance or a patient's willingness to provide publicity.

I hope the United States, Israel and European democracies will increasingly support Iranians' right to freedom and accountable government. I also see opportunities for wider cooperation among Iranian organizations around Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's transitional role. These are political hopes and assessments, rather than claims that international agreement has already been achieved.

CHAPTER ONE

Why Organization Matters

The movement as a living body

For a surgeon, the human body offers a useful analogy for organization. The brain integrates information and coordinates action. The nervous system carries signals between the centre and the body's different parts. The skeleton provides support, while muscles translate coordinated signals into movement. No part can fulfil the work of the whole on its own.

A body responds effectively when information reaches the centre and decisions return to the places where action is needed. Sensitive nerve endings detect changes early. Reliable communication allows the organism to adjust before a small problem becomes a major injury. Structure gives resilience, but excessive rigidity limits adaptation. A political movement also needs stability and the ability to respond to changing circumstances.

The analogy has limits. Citizens have independent judgment, rights and different experiences. A democratic organization should therefore allow information and criticism to travel in both directions. Leadership needs to hear what people encounter, explain its decisions and correct mistakes. Coordination becomes stronger when those doing the work can influence how it is organized.

Why people hesitate to organize openly

For Iranians resisting a repressive state, the difficulty is not simply a lack of interest in organization. People fear consequences for their families and relatives inside Iran. The pressures they describe include intimidation and threats against homes, money, land and other property. Someone willing to contribute may nevertheless hesitate to place a full name on a public membership list.

It is easy to misread that caution as indifference. A movement that wants sustained participation must understand the circumstances of the people it asks to join. Trust is built when responsibilities are clear and personal information is treated with care. Courage should not be measured only by public visibility.

European democracies offer much greater space for open association and have long traditions of parties, professional bodies, trade unions and voluntary organizations. Iranians abroad can learn from those traditions. However, legal freedom where a person lives does not automatically remove anxiety about relatives or property in Iran. Organizational expectations must take that reality into account.

The cost of disconnected effort

The Lion and Sun movement contains considerable professional capacity. Doctors and other health professionals are thinking about care and the future health system. Engineers, architects and planners are considering roads, housing and infrastructure. Others are working on oil production, water supplies, education, secular institutions and the modernization of Iran.

These efforts have value. The difficulty arises when several groups undertake similar work without knowing what others have already done, or when useful proposals have no route into a common programme. Time and expertise are spent repeatedly on the same task, while important gaps may remain unnoticed. The problem is a lack of connection between available skills and shared priorities.

I therefore favour an umbrella structure under the transitional leadership of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, bringing professional and civic organizations into a common framework. Such a structure should make it easier to identify work already under way, connect relevant expertise and clarify who is responsible for each task. Cooperation need not erase the identity or professional independence of every participating organization.

The call for coordination is already present in Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's public statements. In his message to Iranians abroad on 22 January 2026, he called for aligned activity and warned against parallel programmes in the same city.[5] The organizational challenge is to turn that principle into dependable relationships and working arrangements.

Why leadership cannot be created by instruction alone

A natural question follows: why does Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi not simply organize everything from the top down? My answer is that effective national leadership requires more than a declaration. It needs the confidence of people inside Iran, cooperation among organizations and the ability to show that decisions reflect a legitimate purpose. International support can help, but it cannot replace Iranian consent.

The legacy of 1979 remains part of this difficulty. I reject a simplified account in which the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy is treated as proof that Iranians permanently rejected every possible constitutional role for that family. In my interpretation, revolutionary mobilization, support for Ayatollah Khomeini, misleading democratic promises, propaganda and international misjudgments contributed to the outcome. Questions about foreign interests, intelligence activity and financial support belong to a disputed history and require specific documentary evidence; they should not be presented as a single, proven explanation.

Whatever judgment one makes about that history, the political choice facing Iranians today must be theirs. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's capacity to lead will be strengthened by demonstrable support, credible representatives and institutions that people trust. The movement must earn participation rather than assume that a historical name alone settles the question of authority.

An umbrella for transition and reconstruction

I envisage a future stage in which an external transitional administration, potentially taking the form of a government in exile, could bring the movement's dispersed capabilities into a more coherent national framework and seek international recognition. This is my proposal for the future. Its formation, recognition and effectiveness would depend on circumstances and support; none is guaranteed.

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi announced a Transition System framework on 14 March 2026, intended to be ready to administer the country after the Islamic Republic falls.[6] That announcement is relevant to this discussion. An announced transition framework, a functioning administration and international recognition are nevertheless separate matters. My proposal concerns how professional organizations could connect their work to a legitimate and accountable national structure.

Under such an umbrella, organizations could coordinate their work or merge where their members judged that useful. A common framework should help people contribute their expertise while preserving space for debate and the eventual democratic competition between constitutional alternatives. Preparing for transition should also include the practical foundations of reconstruction: functioning health services, reliable infrastructure, education and public administration.

We should not wait for every future institution to exist before improving cooperation now. Existing groups can begin by clarifying their purpose, communicating with one another and learning where their work overlaps. Humanitarian care and professional preparation can continue while the wider political framework develops.

Organization matters because it enables a movement to retain knowledge, sustain effort and respond when circumstances change. The task is to connect the strength that already exists, so that the Lion and Sun movement can act with the coherence of a living body while respecting the freedom and judgment of its members.

DOCUMENTATION

Source Notes

The biographical passages and personal assessments are based on the author's dictation. The MBA institution has been left unnamed because the dictated university and location require confirmation. Political judgments, interpretations of 1979 and future scenarios belong to the author; the numbered sources support the specific public facts and statements identified in the text.

Public sources checked on 23 October 2026. Each source title below is a clickable link.

1. Mansoor Hekmat and the author's early political experience

Koorosh Modaresi, On Mansoor Hekmat, 4 July 2002. A contemporary statement from the Worker-communist Party of Iran Political Bureau, used here for Hekmat's party role, date of death and cancer. Its political evaluations are those of the writer.

[Read the source](#)

2. The right to choose the future political system

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, official summary of his interview with 60 Minutes on CBS News, 1 March 2026. This records his stated transitional role and principles; it is not an independent measurement of public support.

[Read the source](#)

3. The January 2026 killings and repression

Amnesty International Australia, Iran: Authorities unleash heavily militarized clampdown to hide protest massacres, 29 January 2026. The report addresses the killings of 8-9 January, repression and obstacles to documentation. Figures reported at that time are not treated here as a final casualty count.

[Read the source](#)

4. Cooperation across constitutional preferences

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, speech at the Cyrus the Great II event in Toronto, 19 September 2026. Used for his stated welcome to republicans and monarchists who share the movement's declared principles.

[Read the source](#)

5. Coordination and parallel programmes

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, Message to Iranians Abroad, Emphasis on Six Specific Demands from the International Community, 22 January 2026. Used for the appeal to coordinate activity and avoid duplicated local programmes.

[Read the source](#)

6. The announced transition framework

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, Announcing the Plan to Govern the Country Under the Transition System, 14 March 2026. The statement describes an intended future administration; it does not itself establish international recognition.

[Read the source](#)

Related writing by the author

Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, *Empowering the Domestic Sphere, the Islamic Republic's Forced Pragmatism, and the Future of a Secular Democratic Alternative*, original manuscript 16 June 2026, revised 13 October 2026. Consulted for continuity of the author's discussion of civic institutions and effective organization. [Read on the author's website.](#)

CHAPTER TWO

What Is the Problem with Having No Organization?

Small groups, PESTEL and the responsibilities of citizenship

Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh | MD, PhD, MBA

2.1 From enthusiasm to belonging

A movement can attract many enthusiastic people and still struggle to act as a coherent whole. People may share a flag, a leader and a desire for change, yet remain uncertain about where they belong, what they can contribute and how their efforts connect with the work of others. Without organization, enthusiasm can remain scattered and useful experience can be lost.

In Chapter One, I described the movement through the analogy of a living body. Here I turn to its smallest working units: the people who meet, learn, discuss and accept responsibility together. Large gatherings can express national feeling. Small groups can give that feeling continuity and a practical purpose.

A group of three to five people offers a manageable beginning, inside Iran or in the diaspora, according to people's circumstances. Members can know one another, speak without becoming anonymous in a crowd, and recognise that their contribution matters. The three-to-five-person approach I have referred to in connection with Guard-e Javidan is considered here as a model for civic discussion, education and mutual support.

Such a group can read books, review history, discuss Iran's future and examine current events. It can listen carefully to Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's public messages and prepare to respond thoughtfully to calls for coordinated civic participation. The group becomes useful when discussion produces shared understanding, a clear responsibility or a completed piece of work.

Small size alone does not solve the problem of disorganization. If every group remains disconnected, the movement still lacks a way to learn from experience or identify gaps. The purpose is to connect personal trust with a wider national direction while preserving members' judgment and dignity.

2.2 Understanding the circumstances

Organization needs an informed understanding of the situation in which people are living. The crisis surrounding Iran has developed through a long chain of political decisions, confrontation and missed opportunities. Forty-seven years after 1979, the Islamic Republic's slogans of 'Death to America' and 'Death to Israel' remain central to my criticism of its political outlook. Understanding that history, however, also requires attention to evidence and consequences.

Military strikes in June 2025 were followed by renewed United States and Israeli strikes on 28 February 2026. The United Nations Secretary-General condemned that escalation and Iran's subsequent retaliation across the region, warning of serious consequences for civilians and international security.^[1,2]

The nuclear question remains part of this context. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documented uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the June 2025 attacks. Its June 2026 report described continuing limits on access and verification, including an inability to establish the current stockpile or whether enrichment had been suspended. Those findings describe serious unresolved verification problems; they do not establish that Iran possesses a nuclear weapon.^[1]

The Strait of Hormuz is another source of continuing uncertainty. Reporting in October 2026 described disrupted shipping, pressure on Iranian oil exports and the use of alternative export routes. Claims by Tehran or Washington about control of the strait need to be distinguished from the conditions actually experienced by ships and their crews. A claimed route through the strait does not, by itself, resolve the wider conflict.^[3]

Economic pressure and lost revenue may weaken the governing system, but they also affect ordinary households. As a major trauma surgeon, I cannot discuss war solely as a contest between states. Its consequences include injury, disability, bereavement, displacement and the disruption of care. Opposition to repression must remain connected to concern for human life.

My view is that a durable democratic transition ultimately depends on the Iranian people. Foreign military action alone cannot create public consent or functioning democratic institutions. Reduced willingness or capacity to use lethal force could change the conditions for popular mobilization, but neither the timing nor the outcome can be promised.

Possible divisions between those favouring negotiation and those committed to further confrontation should be examined as political possibilities. They should not be presented as an established split without evidence. Preparation requires judgment about changing circumstances, rather than confidence in a single predicted ending.

2.3 Organization must include care

The people injured during the January 2026 uprising remain part of the movement's responsibility. The UN Fact-Finding Mission's September 2026 report describes the use of lethal ammunition against protesters on 8 and 9 January. The consequences of such violence continue long after the demonstrations themselves.^[4]

Groups seeking to help casualties need to connect compassion with competent care. Useful preparation includes recognised first-aid education, links with qualified clinicians, rehabilitation support and practical help for injured people and their families. As a surgeon, I see the value of cooperation between those who identify a need and those able to provide an appropriate service.

I believe these efforts should seek international medical, educational and logistical support. Potential contacts may include civilian institutions and, where appropriate, the medical services of the Israeli, American, British, German and French armed forces. These are proposed avenues for humanitarian cooperation, with a defined purpose, suitable expertise and documented arrangements.

Humanitarian support should follow the injured person's needs and consent. An individual's access to care should not depend on political publicity or a willingness to become a symbol of the movement. A movement committed to human dignity should demonstrate that commitment in the way it supports people.

2.4 PESTEL: six areas of understanding

PESTEL is a familiar framework for examining Political, Economic, Sociocultural, Technological, Environmental and Legal factors. It is also called PESTLE when the final two letters are reversed. I apply these six areas here to the knowledge and responsibilities that a civic group needs.^[5]

LENS	DOMAIN	CIVIC PRIORITY
P	Political	Understand leadership, events and the purpose of transition.
E	Economic	Understand livelihoods, resources and reconstruction needs.
S	Sociocultural	Build trust, belonging and cooperation across differences.
T	Technological	Develop digital literacy and continuity of communication.
E	Environmental	Protect Iran's natural environment and animal welfare.
L	Legal	Understand human rights, equal citizenship and democratic choice.

2.5 Political, economic and sociocultural knowledge

The six PESTEL areas are connected. They do not require six separate factions or six people in every group. Members of a three-to-five-person group can cover more than one area, share what they learn and ask others for expertise. The framework helps a group notice what it has overlooked.

Political: understanding the purpose of change

Political knowledge begins with history, institutions and an understanding of the present crisis. Members should examine different explanations, compare sources and learn to separate an established event from a rumour, a prediction or a political preference. Reading together can make disagreement more useful by moving discussion towards evidence.

Listening to Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's public statements should help people understand the direction of the movement and the reasons for coordinated action. His official website places the organization of Iranians alongside support for the people, defections from the regime and the Iran Prosperity Project. The task for small groups is to give that broad emphasis on organization a useful local expression.^[7]

Economic: understanding the conditions of daily life

Economic understanding should connect national politics with the experience of families. Groups can discuss employment, inflation, household costs, public services, oil revenue and the resources needed for recovery. They should ask how proposed policies would affect people and how future reconstruction could be financed and managed.

Resources within the movement also require care. A group that raises money or undertakes a project should know its purpose, record its commitments and account for what has been done. Trust becomes stronger when people can understand how resources are used and whether a promised result has been delivered.

Sociocultural: building a community of citizens

A national movement needs people with different experiences, beliefs and professional skills. Trust grows when members listen, give others room to contribute and avoid treating every difference as evidence of disloyalty. A small group can become a place where people learn to cooperate without abandoning independent thought.

The diaspora can contribute knowledge, professional contacts and experience of institutions abroad. People inside Iran understand conditions that cannot be fully appreciated from a distance. Their contributions should inform one another. National consolidation depends on respect for these different experiences and on a shared commitment to Iran's future.

2.6 Technology, environment and law

Technological: keeping knowledge and communication useful

People need the skills to use the internet, assess information and communicate responsibly. Groups should also consider how learning and mutual support can continue when ordinary services are disrupted. Keeping essential educational materials available offline and agreeing how to check on one another can reduce dependence on a single platform.

The satellite-internet service I had in mind is **Starlink**, operated by SpaceX. In January 2026, Reuters reported that SpaceX had made the service free for Iranians amid the internet blackout, while also reporting interference and disruption. That was a dated report about a particular period, rather than a guarantee of universal or permanently free access.^[6]

Technological competence also includes recognising misleading images, checking the origin and date of a message, and obtaining consent before circulating another person's information. The purpose is to support informed participation and continuity of community life.

Environmental: responsibility for the country itself

Concern for Iran includes its forests, trees, water, wildlife and living environment. A political movement should connect the wish for national renewal with responsibility for the land and the conditions in which future generations will live. Environmental knowledge belongs within civic education and planning for reconstruction.

Care for animals, including domestic cats and dogs, is part of the compassion I want to see in public life. Small groups can learn about local environmental needs, support responsible welfare initiatives and discuss how future institutions should protect nature. These commitments give national feeling a daily and practical expression.

Legal: knowing the rights that must be protected

Members should understand human rights, equal citizenship, freedom of expression, secular democracy and the role of independent legal institutions. The equality of women and men must be reflected in participation and responsibility within the movement, as well as in the future constitutional order.

The ballot box is central. The people must be able to decide between a republic and a constitutional monarchy through a free democratic process. Whatever the result, government must remain accountable and the law must apply to leaders as well as citizens. A group that learns these principles is preparing to take part in democracy, rather than merely anticipating a change of rulers.

2.7 Leadership and the responsibility to participate

I support Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's transitional leadership because of the principles I believe the movement should advance: human rights, secular democracy, the rule of law, the free vote of citizens, Iran's territorial integrity and equality between women and men. His royal identity is part of his public role. The democratic purpose represented by that role is what matters most to my argument.

Those principles should also provide a standard by which leadership is judged. A movement can respect a leader, listen to his messages and coordinate around a common direction while retaining the capacity to ask questions and offer informed criticism. My published civic principles connect national consolidation with pluralism, equal citizenship and peaceful participation.^[8]

Chanting a leader's name can express solidarity, but it cannot perform the work of citizenship. People need to read, learn, organise, care for others and accept responsibility for their own contributions. Supporting Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi should encourage that work. It should not lead people to wait passively for a royal figure to solve every problem on their behalf.

2.8 A strong nation, a strong government and a strong team

When I use the expressions *Japanization* or *Israelization* of Iranian society, I mean a society with civic energy, education, competence, resilience and a willingness to participate. These are my terms for qualities I want Iranians to develop. Iran should learn selectively from other countries while building institutions suited to its own history and public choices.

A strong nation has citizens who understand their rights and responsibilities. A strong government has the capacity to serve the public while remaining subject to law and democratic accountability. A strong team brings different skills into a shared task, learns from feedback and gives people a meaningful role.

Small groups are one place where these habits can begin. Reading together strengthens knowledge. Supporting an injured person gives solidarity a practical form. Accounting for a shared project develops responsibility. Respecting disagreement makes cooperation possible. Each of these activities helps people practise the society they wish to create.

The work before us is therefore a mass civic effort with a democratic purpose. National change will need informed citizens as well as leadership, functioning institutions as well as enthusiasm, and practical cooperation as well as shared symbols. Organization should allow the Iranian people to become active participants in shaping their future.

Source notes

Prepared 23 October 2026. Numbered notes support factual passages. Political judgments, proposed responsibilities and the Japanization/Israelization terminology express the author's argument.

[1] International Atomic Energy Agency. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. GOV/2026/33, 4 June 2026, especially paragraphs 21 and 25-26. Documents the pre-attack enrichment estimate and limits on subsequent verification. [IAEA report](#).

[2] United Nations Secretary-General. Statement by the Secretary-General on Iran, 28 February 2026. Identifies the US and Israeli use of force and subsequent Iranian retaliation, and calls for de-escalation. [UN statement](#).

[3] Financial Times. Middle East oil exports climb back to prewar levels, 22 October 2026; and US is prepared for long stand-off with Iran, says Trump envoy, 23 October 2026. Contemporary reporting on disrupted routes, Iranian export restrictions and the continuing stand-off. [Shipping report](#).

Additional FT report: US-Iran stand-off, 23 October 2026.

[4] UN Human Rights Council / Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran. Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran. A/HRC/63/61, September 2026. Describes lethal ammunition used against protesters on 8 and 9 January. [UN report](#).

[5] Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. PESTLE analysis, factsheet, 21 March 2025. Source for the six-domain framework; its application to civic groups in this chapter is the author's proposal. [CIPD factsheet](#).

[6] Joey Roulette and Cassell Bryan-Low / Reuters. Musk's Starlink faces high-profile security test in Iran crackdown, 16 January 2026, updated 17 January. Reports the fee waiver and disruption during the January blackout. [Reuters report](#).

[7] Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, official website. The Five Pillars. Lists the organization of Iranians, support for the people, defections from the regime and the Iran Prosperity Project within its transition strategy. [Official website](#).

[8] Peyman Bakhshayesh. The principles that connect us. The author's current statement of secular democracy, equal citizenship, rule of law, pluralism and peaceful civic participation. [Author's principles](#).

Chapter scope: the small-group model is presented as civic education and mutual support, rather than a reproduction of a Guard-e Javidan manual. The proposed international medical contacts are prospective avenues for cooperation. Current events and service availability should be reviewed when the complete book is assembled.

CHAPTER THREE

From Parallel Effort to National Coordination

A shared mission, practical structures and the disciplines of change

3.1 The time to connect

The small groups described in Chapter Two are the beginnings of a wider capacity. When circumstances permit, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi could call upon Iranians to connect their existing work through professional and civic umbrella organizations. Education, finance, political affairs, media, international advocacy, healthcare and infrastructure would then contribute to a common national purpose.

I envisage a structure informed by the Iran Prosperity Project, in which useful work already being done can be found, assessed and brought together. A coordinated network need not require every organization to dissolve. Some may merge voluntarily; others may cooperate through agreed responsibilities, shared standards and a dependable route for decisions. The aim is to make scattered competence available where it is needed.

This connection cannot be created by a declaration alone. Groups need trust, compatible ways of working and a clear understanding of who has authority to decide what. Preparation now can make a later call for national coordination more effective. A sudden opportunity is easier to use when relationships and responsibilities already exist.

Many Iranians in the diaspora have learned from living and working in Germany, Britain, France, the United States, Scandinavia, Italy, Spain and other societies. Professional life, voluntary associations and public institutions can teach listening, planning, accountability and respect for procedure. These experiences give us resources to contribute; they do not make us superior to people inside Iran, whose knowledge of local circumstances is indispensable.

I reject the fatalistic claim that Iranians are strong only as isolated individuals and incapable of working together. Cooperation is a practice that can be learned and strengthened. A clear mission helps, but habits of listening, fair decisions and completed work make the mission credible. We should build those habits before expecting a national structure to carry our hopes.

3.2 A proposed umbrella for common work

The table below is my organizational proposal. It is not an announcement of departments formally established by the Iran Prosperity Project, nor a claim to speak on its behalf. The Project's published subject areas provide relevant policy material; participating organizations would still need to agree their own mandates and relationship to any future transition structure.[1]

A useful umbrella should connect local initiative with professional assessment and accountable leadership. Each sector needs a named responsibility, a defined output and a way to receive feedback from the people affected.

Proposed sector	Contribution to a common programme
Education and civic learning	Prepare accessible learning materials; support teachers; explain equal citizenship and democratic institutions.
Finance and economic recovery	Develop transparent budgets, resource records and realistic recovery proposals; arrange independent financial scrutiny.
Political and constitutional affairs	Prepare public discussion of constitutional choices, representative institutions and lawful limits on transitional power.
Media and public communication	Check sources, explain decisions clearly, correct errors and make information accessible across languages.
International advocacy and lobbying	Present documented civic and humanitarian needs; maintain lawful, transparent dialogue with foreign institutions.
Healthcare and rehabilitation	Connect clinical expertise with needs assessment, continuity of care and support for injured people and families.
Infrastructure and essential services	Prepare proposals for water, energy, transport and communications; identify dependencies between services.
Environment and public welfare	Include land, water, animal welfare and long-term living conditions in reconstruction priorities.

Cooperation should preserve useful local knowledge. A shared framework earns its place by solving problems, resolving duplication and helping people deliver.

3.3 Leadership, legitimacy and the timetable

My political position is clear: the Islamic Republic should give way to a secular democratic constitutional order. I do not regard renewed bargaining that preserves its repressive system as an adequate national destination. I support Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as a transitional leader able to bring different groups towards that purpose.

That support must remain connected to public consent. Transitional leadership, a future constitutional office and an elected government are distinct questions. Republicans and constitutional monarchists should be able to cooperate over the conditions for a free choice, and then argue openly for their preferred settlement.

The current official English Emergency Phase Booklet specifies a 180-day emergency phase, followed by stabilization through the end of transition. Its political paper anticipates an overall process of 18-24 months, with provisions for exceptional extensions. It proposes a referendum on the system of government, an elected constituent assembly, a constitutional referendum and elections to establish constitutional institutions. These are proposed milestones, not guaranteed dates.[1]

Stage	Meaning for organizational preparation
Before a transition	Develop civic competence, professional cooperation and credible proposals without claiming governmental authority.
First 180 days	Prepare to support continuity of services and accountable emergency administration under a legitimate framework.
Constitutional process	Support informed debate, meaningful participation and fair procedures for the people to decide.
Elected institutions	Transfer responsibility to constitutional authorities and sustain independent civic oversight.

Ninety days can be a useful review point within an emergency period. It should not replace the published 180-day definition. The timetable runs from a transition trigger, rather than from the publication of this book.

The end point must be a government subject to law, equal citizenship, separation of religion and state, and a political system freely chosen by Iranians. My preference for constitutional monarchy does not remove the right of others to advocate a democratic republic.

3.4 SMART: make the mission usable

A national aspiration becomes more useful when people can identify a contribution, assign responsibility and review progress. I use SMART here to mean Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound. This is a contemporary adaptation; Doran's original 1981 formulation used Assignable and Realistic for A and R.[2]

Our mission is to build the civic and professional capacity for an Iranian-led transition to a secular constitutional democracy, with the form of government decided freely by the people. The five tests below explain how that mission can guide work.

Test	Application to the mission
S - Specific	Name the intended result: accountable constitutional government, equal rights, separation of religion and state, and a free choice between constitutional alternatives. Give each group a defined contribution.
M - Measurable	Track completed and reviewed work: useful proposals, trained contributors, documented service gaps, transparent accounts and agreed responsibilities. Attendance and online attention alone do not demonstrate readiness.
A - Achievable	Match commitments to available people, expertise, time and resources. Begin with manageable civic or professional tasks; identify what depends on circumstances outside the group's control.
R - Relevant	Ask whether a task advances democratic participation, public welfare, service continuity or institutional competence. Avoid activity sustained mainly by rivalry or personal visibility.
T - Time-bound	Give each task an owner, a deadline and a review date. Tie later national milestones to a clearly defined transition trigger and a legitimate public timetable.

A proposed example

Within eight weeks of agreeing a working charter, an education group could prepare one accessible civic-learning module, obtain review from two suitable contributors and record the changes made after feedback. This is an illustrative target proposed in this book, not an official movement requirement.

The discipline matters more than the example's numbers. A group should be able to explain what it promised, what it completed, what it learned and what it will change. No SMART objective can promise a revolution or guarantee an election outcome.

3.5 PESTEL: understand the external setting

Chapter Two used PESTEL to organize areas of civic learning. Here it serves its usual strategic purpose: examining the external Political, Economic, Sociocultural, Technological, Environmental and Legal setting. The same six factors are often called PESTLE.[3]

The following assessment is my application to democratic transition. It identifies questions and conditions to monitor; it is not a quantitative forecast or evidence that international support is already secured.

Factor	External question	Organizational implication
Political	How might state repression, regional conflict, diplomatic positions and the credibility of alternative leadership affect participation?	Review assumptions and distinguish declared foreign support from concrete commitments. Iranian consent remains central.
Economic	How could household hardship, disrupted services, inflation, sanctions or uncertain resources affect people's ability to contribute?	Make realistic commitments, protect continuity of essential services and explain how proposed work could be resourced.
Sociocultural	How do different generations, languages, local experiences and political memories shape trust?	Create accessible participation and listen to communities directly. Do not treat diaspora experience as a substitute for domestic knowledge.
Technological	How could outages, platform dependence, misleading information and unequal access disrupt communication?	Use source checking, responsible handling of information and practical continuity plans for ordinary civic work.
Environmental	How could water stress, pollution, natural hazards or damaged infrastructure affect welfare and reconstruction?	Include environmental expertise and local needs in service planning instead of postponing them as secondary concerns.
Legal	What human-rights obligations, host-country rules and future constitutional guarantees affect proposed activities?	Obtain appropriate expertise, preserve due process and make equal citizenship a test of both methods and outcomes.

Timing, place, leadership, national symbols and international conditions all matter. They cannot be made favourable merely by declaring them so. A group should record which assumptions have changed and whether those changes require a different priority. Understanding the environment supports judgment; it does not remove uncertainty.

3.6 SWOT: connect capability with conditions

A SWOT analysis separates Strengths and Weaknesses within the organization from Opportunities and Threats in its wider environment.[4] It is therefore broader than an analysis of internal factors alone. In this chapter, the unit being assessed is the proposed civic and professional network supporting democratic transition.

These entries are qualitative judgments for discussion. A representative group should test them against evidence, invite disagreement and revise them as circumstances change.

Dimension	Assessment	Practical consequence
Strengths Internal	Professional knowledge; experience of institutions abroad; voluntary commitment; existing small groups; a shared aspiration for freedom.	Connect complementary skills and identify the work already completed. Make expertise useful through defined responsibilities.
Weaknesses Internal	Disconnected efforts; uneven resources; mistrust; unclear decision rights; dependence on a few visible people; fatigue.	Agree working standards, share tasks, develop successors and resolve disagreements through fair procedures.
Opportunities External	Possible support from democratic institutions; professional exchange; reconstruction needs; opportunities for broader civic participation.	Prepare credible proposals and transparent partnerships. Treat prospective support as a possibility until confirmed.
Threats External	Repression and intimidation; conflict and displacement; disrupted services; misinformation; uncertain foreign policy; renewed authoritarianism.	Keep civilian welfare, reliable information and constitutional limits central. Review whether conditions undermine a planned activity.

Move from the list to a decision

Professional competence is a strength only when someone can apply it to a need. A partnership opportunity becomes useful when its purpose, resources and accountability are agreed. Acknowledging weaknesses allows improvement; concealing them leaves the same problems to reappear at a more difficult moment.

For example, a network with skilled clinicians but fragmented planning could begin with one jointly reviewed rehabilitation proposal and a clear route for feedback. That task uses a strength, addresses a weakness and prepares for future cooperation. It remains a professional contribution rather than a claim that a future ministry already exists.

3.7 Lewin: examine the forces for change

Lewin's force-field approach considers the relationship between forces supporting change and forces restraining it.[5] These may be internal or external. I apply the approach here principally to the habits and relationships within the proposed network, while recognising that repression and wider events remain powerful external constraints.

The desired change is from isolated enthusiasm to dependable democratic cooperation. The table pairs a possible driving force with a restraint and a practical way to improve the balance. The entries are judgments, without numerical scores or a calculated probability of success.

Driving force	Restraining force	Constructive response
A shared wish for freedom	Disagreement over a future republic or monarchy	Agree the democratic process and equal rights as common ground; preserve freedom to campaign for either outcome.
Professional competence	Unclear roles and repeated parallel work	Give a defined output to an agreed lead and invite relevant groups to review it.
Voluntary commitment	Fatigue, time pressure and unrealistic expectations	Share responsibilities, set manageable deadlines and review capacity before accepting further work.
Leadership with a national focus	Personal rivalry and fear of exclusion	Explain decision rules, hear criticism and distinguish coordination from personal loyalty.
Diaspora experience	Distance from circumstances inside Iran	Seek domestic perspectives without presuming access or demanding public visibility.
Solidarity and mutual care	Fear, mistrust and anxiety for families	Respect people's circumstances, avoid pressure to disclose personal information and make support dependable.

The lesson is not simply to demand more enthusiasm. Reducing avoidable restraints can make existing commitment more effective. Clear responsibilities reduce conflict; fair procedures reduce fear of exclusion; realistic workloads reduce exhaustion.

Lewin's wider discussion of social change also directs attention to sustaining new practices. Once cooperation improves, preserve it through regular review, transparent decisions and opportunities to correct mistakes. Stable democratic habits should remain capable of learning, rather than becoming permanently rigid.

3.8 Readiness must be built before the moment

People do not need to become anxious simply because every part of the movement has not yet been fitted into one structure. Parallel initiatives may be necessary while circumstances differ and open organization exposes people to pressure. But reassurance should encourage preparation. A network will not become dependable merely because the moment feels historic.

Each small unit should understand its purpose, the skills available within it and one useful contribution it can complete. It should know how decisions are made, how disagreement is heard and how work will be reviewed. Connections with other groups can then grow around concrete needs rather than around claims of status.

At a wider level, coordination needs a two-way relationship. Leadership should explain direction and priorities; people doing the work should report what they encounter and what a proposal would require. Representatives need a mandate from those they represent. Resources and commitments need records that can be scrutinised. These arrangements make a common structure useful to its members.

A merger should follow an assessment of purpose and consent. Where two organizations duplicate the same work, joining may improve delivery. Where their functions differ, cooperation may be more effective. Size by itself is not the measure of success. The test is whether people can act responsibly, retain knowledge and provide a better contribution to the national mission.

The SMART, PESTEL, SWOT and force-field approaches work together. SMART clarifies the intended result and its review. PESTEL examines the setting. SWOT connects capabilities with conditions. Force-field analysis asks what enables or restrains the necessary change. None should become a ritual that replaces listening or action.

For a surgeon, preparedness is familiar. A theatre team cannot guarantee the course of every operation, but it can know its roles, anticipate needs and communicate as circumstances change. National reconstruction is far more complex, yet the organizational principle is recognisable: competence becomes effective through cooperation and accountability.

I believe Iranians can build that capacity. Our shared history includes division, but it also includes collective effort in pursuit of a national future. The right leadership, the Lion and Sun flag and a clear mission can help bring people together. The lasting achievement must be a society whose institutions serve its citizens and whose political choices remain theirs.

Organization turns hope into a capacity to serve. Democratic accountability keeps that capacity directed towards the people.

Chapter Three - source notes

Sources checked on 23 October 2026. References support the identified published frameworks. The analysis, proposed sectors and illustrative objectives are the author's.

1. Published transition framework

Iran Prosperity Project. Emergency Phase Booklet, English download currently available from the official project website, checked 23 October 2026. The PDF cover states February 2026; the current download filename is dated 8 October 2026. Foreword; Project Structure; Political paper, paragraphs 15.6-15.9 and 20. The project homepage labels its presentation March 2026. The booklet is a proposed framework, rather than a government already in office. [Read source](#).

2. SMART objectives

Doran GT. There's a S.M.A.R.T. way to write management's goals and objectives. *Management Review*. 1981;70(11):35-36. Original formulation: Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, Time-related. Chapter Three explicitly uses an adapted contemporary version. [Read source](#).

3. PESTEL / PESTLE

Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. PESTLE analysis, factsheet. Consulted 23 October 2026 for the external-environment framework. The political application in this chapter is the author's. [Read source](#).

4. SWOT

Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. SWOT analysis, 20 May 2026. Consulted for the distinction between internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats. [Read source](#).

5. Force-field approach

Lewin K. Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change. *Human Relations*. 1947;1(1):5-41. doi:10.1177/001872674700100103. Used for the conceptual framework; the civic examples and judgments are the author's. [Read source](#).

Related writing by the author

Peyman Bakhshayesh. The Illusion of Stability, 16 October 2026; and The principles that connect us. These provide continuity for the discussion of democratic legitimacy, pluralism and civic institutions. [Read source](#).

The book expresses the author's political views in a personal capacity. It is independent of the Iran Prosperity Project and is not an official programme or an endorsement by the institutions cited.

CHAPTER FOUR - CONCLUSION

Organize for a Free Iran

Resilience, leadership and the sovereignty of the people

4.1 Small groups, a common direction

I, Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh, MD, PhD, MBA, have argued throughout this book for organization and the development of organizational skills. At the same time, I recognise why parallel organizations and small groups are necessary under present conditions. There is no contradiction between these positions. The form of organization must respond to the character of the mission and the pressures facing those who take part.

The Islamic Republic's brutality, intimidation and hostility towards activists are central to my argument. People may be willing to contribute while fearing consequences for relatives, livelihoods or property. A smaller group can offer personal trust, mutual support and a manageable responsibility. Such caution should be understood rather than dismissed as a failure of commitment.

Yet smallness should not become a permanent excuse for isolation. Each group can learn, complete useful work and develop relationships with others whose principles it shares. As circumstances change, those relationships can support broader coordination. Organization grows through people accepting responsibility together, rather than waiting for a perfect national structure to arrive.

My call is therefore direct: if you care deeply about Iran's future, seek an organization whose principles and conduct accord with your ideals, and contribute as soon as your circumstances allow. Read, listen, discuss, volunteer your professional knowledge, support those in need and help a common task reach completion. A public title is less valuable than a responsibility carried reliably.

Organization makes us more robust. We can share burdens, retain experience and sustain effort when one person becomes tired or faces pressure. Mutual trust allows people to ask for help. A clear task gives purpose to time and energy. A group that can admit a mistake and correct it becomes more resilient than one concerned only with appearances.

The quality of an organization must be visible in its treatment of people. It should make room for women and men, different generations and different experiences; respect disagreement; account for resources; and support human dignity. A movement preparing for democratic government should practise these habits within its own life.

4.2 Leadership in the service of a shared future

I support Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi because I regard his transitional role as a focus for national cooperation and a route towards secular democracy. In my view, his strongest claim is his emphasis on the Iranian people reclaiming their own political power. I see the leadership we need as standing across factions and bringing republicans and constitutional monarchists towards a common democratic process.

I therefore ask people to listen carefully to his public messages, examine his published proposals and take seriously the work of coordination. His public transition framework affirms separation of religion and state, individual freedoms, equality before the law and the people's right to choose their future system.[1] These principles are the basis on which I offer my support.

Listening should lead to informed participation. A national leader cannot personally perform every task in education, healthcare, infrastructure, finance or public communication. Citizens and professional groups must contribute their judgment and labour. Leadership gives direction; organized people give that direction practical capacity.

My confidence in Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi does not require declaring that every Iranian already agrees with me, or denying other citizens their right to peaceful political advocacy. I believe he can help unite the nation at a decisive moment. The democratic strength of that role will depend on openness, public trust, clear limits and a credible route to elected constitutional institutions.

The ballot box is central to this argument. Whether the people choose a republic or a constitutional monarchy, the result must rest on a free and fair process. Equal opportunity to express alternatives, access to reliable information and meaningful participation give a vote its democratic substance. The chosen constitution must protect those whose preference does not prevail.

National consolidation means learning to work with people who share the essential mission while disagreeing about other matters. As I have written in my civic principles, a common future requires pluralism, equal citizenship, freedom of expression and peaceful participation.[2] These are habits to develop now and institutions to protect later.

The movement should be strong enough to coordinate and confident enough to hear criticism. That combination can help prevent the concentration of authority from becoming an end in itself. The leader, the flag and the organization should serve the nation's future, with the people remaining the source of political legitimacy.

4.3 From the constitutional aspiration to modern citizenship

The constitutional movement of 1906 belongs to Iran's long effort to bring government under law and give the nation a voice in its own affairs. I see our present responsibility as carrying that aspiration into the conditions of the modern world. History gives us a task; it does not relieve us of the need to build institutions capable of fulfilling it.

The future I seek has separation of religion and state, equal citizenship, independent justice, representative government and leaders accountable under the law. Citizens should be able to believe, change their beliefs or hold no religious belief. Public power must be exercised for the population, with constitutional safeguards that do not depend on the goodwill of a particular ruler.

Organization must develop from the foundations of society towards its national institutions. Local associations, professional bodies, voluntary groups and independent civic voices allow people to identify needs, contribute knowledge and question decisions. A functioning society requires these everyday relationships as well as a government able to deliver services and protect rights.

The education group, the healthcare team, the infrastructure specialist and the person helping an injured neighbour all have a place in this work. Their contributions should become connected through clear purposes and accountable structures. A modern Iran will need competent administration, but it will also need citizens who understand that participation continues after a transition.

We should use a historical opportunity with hope and judgment. No analysis can guarantee that the timing, international conditions or political outcome will favour us. What we can improve is our own readiness: our capacity to listen, cooperate, learn, care and complete the work we accept.

This is my concluding appeal to Iranians who long for a free future. Find your place, develop your skills and help others contribute. Support leadership that opens a path towards the people's free choice. Let the Lion and Sun express a shared national hope, and let our conduct give that hope substance. Through organization, resilience and democratic responsibility, we can work towards an Iran whose people reclaim their own power.

Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh
MD, PhD, MBA
23 October 2026

Chapter Four - source notes

[1] Iran Prosperity Project. Emergency Phase Booklet, current official English download, foreword and Political paper. [Read framework](#). [2] Peyman Bakhshayesh. The principles that connect us. [Read principles](#). Political evaluations and this concluding appeal are the author's.